Request modification for web security challenge

ABSTRACT

Techniques are provided for request modification for web security challenge. Data corresponding to a web page request by a client computing device for a web page is received. The web page comprises web code that allows a user to submit a request to initiate a web transaction with a web server system. Challenge code is generated that determines one or more values that are a valid solution to a challenge. The challenge code is provided for integrated code to be served in response to the web page request. The integrated code comprises the challenge code and modified web code that adds one or more parameters for the valid solution to the request. A particular request is received to initiate the web transaction. It is determined that the one or more parameter values are not a valid solution. In response, the web server system is prevented from processing the particular request.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 120 as aContinuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/202,755, filed on2016 Jul. 6, which claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1), to U.S.Provisional Application Ser. No. 62/189,189, filed on Jul. 6, 2015, theentire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The subject matter of this document generally relates to computersecurity, for improving the operation of various computer systems.

BACKGROUND

One type of security risk faced by businesses and other entitiesoperating on the internet is the possibility that attackers may targettheir online presences, and disrupt their capabilities to deliver onlineservices. A common form of attack in this regard is known as adenial-of-service (DoS) attack, which is generally an attack that aimsto make a server or other network resource unavailable to its intendedusers. DoS attacks are often carried out by botnets that haveinfiltrated many different network endpoints (e.g., client computingdevices), and that exploit the endpoints to simultaneously flood atarget server with thousands, or even millions, of communicationrequests. The extreme volume of requests can overload the ability of theserver to respond to legitimate web traffic, or can at least impair theserver's response time to such a degree that it becomes effectivelynon-responsive. In some cases, DoS attacks can be particularly effectiveby flooding a target server with requests to initiate web transactionsthat are known to be computationally expensive. For example, e-commercewebsites often allow users to maintain a shopping cart of items thatthey may purchase. Adding and removing items from a cart can becomputationally expensive due to significant backend processingperformed by the server before a response is generated. Some attackershave exploited the shopping cart, and other expensive transactions, tocarry out successful DoS attacks. The consequences of DoS attacks can besignificant for targets of the attack, who may suffer financial loss asa result of the attack (e.g., from lost sales that would have occurredwhile its online services were unavailable), and who may even be harmedin the longer-term after an attack has occurred due to negativeperceptions of the target's services as insecure or unreliable.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 depicts a conceptual flow diagram of an example process 100 forserving a web page with a challenge to be solved by a client computingdevice, and determining whether to perform a web transaction based onthe validity of a solution presented by the client.

FIG. 2 depicts a timeline 200 over which various client computingdevices have submitted requests including challenge solutions to aserver system, in which some requests are accepted as valid and othersare rejected as invalid.

FIG. 3 depicts a schematic diagram conceptually illustrating thetopography of a computer network 300 over which content is communicatedbetween origin web servers and client computing devices via a securityintermediary and a content delivery network (CDN).

FIG. 4 is a flowchart of an example process 400 for utilizingasymmetrical challenges to improve the security of one or morecomputers.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart of an example process 500 for solving a SHA-2hashing challenge by a client computing device.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of a computing system 600 for implementingasymmetrical challenges in served content to improve the security of oneor more computers.

FIG. 7 depicts a system for serving polymorphic and instrumented code.

FIG. 8 depicts a schematic diagram of an example computer system thatcan be used to perform the operations associated with thecomputer-implemented methods and other techniques described herein.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

This document generally describes systems, methods, devices, and othertechniques for implementing user-agent challenges to distinguishlegitimate and illegitimate traffic communicated to a web server. Insome implementations, techniques consistent with those described hereinmay be utilized to interfere with the ability of botnets and othermalicious actors to carry out a denial of service, or other large-scaleattack, against one or more computing targets. These techniques arediscussed in further detail with respect to the figures.

General Overview

This document generally describes systems, methods, devices, and othertechniques for disrupting the ability of botnets and other maliciousactors to carry out a DoS or other large-scale attack against one ormore computing targets. In some implementations, the techniquesdescribed herein can be employed to at least partially reverse anasymmetry that has traditionally existed between web servers that aretargeted in such attacks, and client devices that are exploited toperpetrate such attacks.

Consider, for example, an e-commerce website that sells productsaccording to a “flash sales” model. In a flash sale, an online retailer(e.g., the operator of the e-commerce website) sets a product release tooccur at a particular, pre-announced time. Inventory may be limited forthe sale, and sales may be made in the order in which purchase requestsare received from clients. Assuming sufficient demand for the product,this model can create a race among customers to complete purchasesthrough the retailer's website if they wish to be one of the “lucky few”to come away with the product being offered for sale. Flash sales can bequite successful at driving demand for a product, as anxious customerscompete for a limited product inventory. However, the success of suchsales events depends on a process that affords legitimate customers afair opportunity to make sales purchases. In some cases, however, botshave been programmed to hijack computers and to submit requests toinitiate purchase transactions much faster than human operators evercould. Botnets may submit thousands or millions of purchase requestsover a short period of time (e.g., over just a few seconds or fractionsof a second) to the retailer in an effort to either deplete theavailable inventory, or simply to overload the retailer's servers so asto render them non-responsive to legitimate customers' requests.

One reason that botnets have been successful at launching DoS attacksagainst various computing systems is because of the asymmetry thatexists in the computational effort of clients to submit requests tocarry out an attack (which is minimal), and the computational effort ofweb servers to defend against the attack (which can be significant). Forexample, consider a flash sale event where, almost immediately after thesales window opens, the retailer's server is flooded with millions ofillegitimate requests initiated by infected computers under the controlof a botnet, but only several thousand legitimate requests from humancustomers. Whereas the individual acts of transmitting requests from theclients is relatively simple and computationally inexpensive, handlingall of the requests at the servers, on the other hand, can be veryexpensive—particularly when the requests are requests to perform arelatively complex web transaction, such as to add an item to anelectronic shopping cart. If the requests are well-behaved at thenetwork layer, servers have traditionally found it difficult todiscriminate among legitimate and illegitimate requests. In an attemptto handle a wave of illegitimate purchase transactions (e.g.,add-to-cart), the servers may become bogged down and generally incapableof responding in a timely manner to legitimate user requests. The burdenof defending an attack can thus be disproportionate relative to theeffort expended by each of the infected client computers to participatein the attack.

The techniques described in this document can be used to at leastpartially shift this burden between the servers that are targeted in anattack and the clients that perpetrate the attack, so as to nip anattack in its early stages. In some implementations, for example,content that is served to a client computing device can be supplementedwith a challenge. The client device may be required to solve thechallenge, and to submit a valid solution along with any subsequentrequests to the servers to initiate (perform) certain transactions.Without a valid solution, requests to the servers may be denied and thetransactions may be blocked from being carried out. Challenges may deterthe clients' abilities to overload a server with requests due in part tothe amount of time required to solve a challenge and obtain a validsolution. For example, whereas a client may have previously been able tosubmit 1,000 valid requests per second under the control of a bot orbotnet, the time required to solve a challenge may slow the rate ofvalid request submissions by several orders of magnitude. The serverstargeted in an attack can therefore deal with a much smaller volume oftraffic, and can more easily discern which traffic is legitimate andwhich traffic is not.

Different types of challenges may be employed in differentimplementations. In some implementations, the challenges may generallyhave an “asymmetrical” characteristic, in that the computational expenseor time required to solve the challenge at the client device is greaterthan the computational expense or time required to validate that acorrect solution has been determined. This characteristic can beachieved with a hashing challenge, in some implementations. For example,a web page that is to be served to a client computing device can bere-coded to include a script (e.g., JavaScript) that defines the hashingchallenge. The script can be programmed so that the client automaticallyruns the hashing challenge, even without user intervention. In someimplementations, the hashing challenge may be a program that causes theclient to determine a message whose hash value matches a pre-definedhash value. A robust hashing algorithm may be selected to compute thehash value of the message, such as the SHA-2 hashing algorithm. TheSHA-2 algorithm has been scrutinized and verified as being reliablynon-reversible and collision resistant. These properties can prevent aclient device from short-circuiting the challenge, to find a solution(i.e. the message input to the hashing algorithm) that outputs apre-defined hash value, in a manner other than by brute force of tryingdifferent message values until the pre-defined hash value results. Otherhashes or algorithms that have similar properties may be used in someimplementations.

Referring again to the flash sale example, the webpage on which aproduct is sold may be embedded with a hashing challenge. Before theclient can submit a valid request to initiate a purchasing transaction,it must obtain a solution to the challenge, which generally takes a notinsignificant amount of time. A server receiving requests from clientscan determine whether the requests include a valid solution, and cantake appropriate action to either allow or deny the requests. In thismanner, performance of computationally expensive transactions can beavoided when illegitimate requests are not accompanied by a validsolution. Further according to some implementations of the techniquesdescribed herein, safeguards can be included to prevent replay attacksand fraudulent solutions. A replay attack could occur, for example, ifbots were able to solve a single challenge and repeatedly re-use thesolution to that challenge in a multitude of subsequent requests—withoutsolving additional challenges for each of the subsequent requests. Toprevent such tactics, the techniques described herein can verify thatsolutions presented by the client computing devices have not been usedmore than a predetermined number of times (e.g., once). Even if asolution is technically valid in that it produces a correct hash valuefor a given hashing challenge, the solution may nonetheless be deemedinvalid if it has been previously accepted as a valid solution, forexample. In some implementations, fraudulent solutions can be preventedas well, such as solutions to invalid challenges that have beenindependently fabricated by an untrusted source. As is described ingreater detail below, a challenge may be signed by a trusted source toensure that a solution is presented to a valid challenge.

Denial of service attacks are often premised on an overwhelming numberof requests reaching a particular server or servers for processing. Thisdocument describes techniques, however, that may prevent all or aportion of illegitimate requests from reaching a targeted server at all.To this end, intermediate servers in a network, such as nodes in acontent delivery network (CDN), may determine the validity of a requestbefore the request reaches the targeted server. The intermediate serversmay allow legitimate requests to pass to the targeted server, whereasillegitimate requests may be denied without communicating the request tothe targeted server. Moreover, because requests may be distributed amongmultiple CDN nodes, the volume of illegitimate requests handled by eachnode may be reduced to only a relatively small portion of the overallvolume submitted during an attack.

In some implementations, the various techniques described herein mayachieve none, one, or more of the following advantages. To begin, thevolume of illegitimate requests processed by a web server may besubstantially reduced. When intermediate servers, such as servers in acontent delivery network, are employed between an origin web server andthe client computer, the intermediate servers may filter illegitimaterequests from reaching the origin web server, so that the origin webserver can focus on responding to legitimate requests. And regardless ofthe presence of intermediate servers, the techniques can discern thelegitimacy of a request by determining whether a solution is valid in acomputationally inexpensive manner. In particular, the validity of thesolution may be determined before initiating a computationally expensivetransaction, so as to minimize the computing resources absorbed inhandling illegitimate requests that could otherwise overwhelm a server.Additionally, the challenges may be implemented in a stateless mannerthat does not require a server to correlate solutions it receives tosaved information about challenges that were previously served. Forexample, any data that may be needed to validate a solution to achallenge may be served to the client with the challenge, and thenreturned to the server by the client along with the solution to be usedin validating the challenge. A further advantage may result in someimplementations where the challenge is written in a programming language(e.g., JavaScript) that is widely adopted across many platforms so thatthe challenge can be universally executed by different user agents.Additionally, the challenges may be polymorphic as a further safeguardagainst replay attacks. Polymorphism may include constructing differentpermutations of challenges to be served to different client computingdevices, so that the solution to any particular challenge cannot bere-used. Moreover, the challenge may utilize a robust, non-reversiblealgorithm so as to mitigate the risk of a solution being determined in ashort-circuited manner. Additional features and advantages are apparentfrom the specification and the drawings.

Some implementations described herein can include a computer-implementedmethod. The method can include receiving, at a computing system, firstcode that defines at least a portion of an electronic resource that isto be served to a client computing device. The method can generatesecond code that defines a challenge to be solved by the clientcomputing device. The second code can be arranged to cause the clientcomputing device to determine values for one or more parameters thatcomprise a solution to the challenge, and the values for the one or moreparameters that comprise the solution to the challenge may be requiredfor the client computing device to make valid requests to initiate oneor more web-based transactions. The computing system can provide, to theclient computing device, the first code that defines the at least theportion of the electronic resource and the second code that defines thechallenge to be solved by the client computing device. A request fromthe client computing device to initiate a particular web-basedtransaction can be received, the request including particular values forthe one or more parameters that comprise a possible solution to thechallenge. The computing system can determine whether particular valuesfor the one or more parameters comprise a valid solution to thechallenge, and can take action to initiate the particular web-basedtransaction or to not initiate the particular web-based transactionbased on whether the particular values for the one or more parametersare determined to comprise a valid solution to the challenge.

These and other implementations can include one or more of the followingfeatures. The second code can be further arranged to cause the clientcomputing device to determine values for the one or more parameters thatcomprise the solution to the challenge by iteratively testing differentcandidate values in search of values that satisfy one or moreconstraints associated with the challenge.

The challenge to be solved by the client computing device can be todetermine a particular message that yields a pre-defined hash value whenthe particular message is hashed using a particular hash function. Theparticular message that yields the pre-defined hash value can beindicated by the particular values for the one or more parameters.

The particular hash function can be collision resistant andsubstantially non-reversible.

The second code can include at least one script that is written inJavaScript and that is arranged to be interpreted at the clientcomputing device.

The electronic resource can be a web page, and the first code caninclude hypertext markup language (HTML) code.

The second code can further be arranged to execute automatically by theclient computing device in the background (e.g., background operations)while the client computing device loads the web page and/or while a userinteracts with the web page after the page is loaded at the clientcomputing device.

Determining whether the particular values for the one or more parametersincludes a valid solution to the challenge can include: identifying apre-defined output value of a function, the pre-defined output valueprovided to the client computing device with the second code;identifying a pre-defined value for a first input parameter to thefunction, the value for the first input parameter provided to the clientcomputing device with the second code; calculating a second output valueof the function using the value for the first input parameter and theparticular values for the one or more parameters included in therequest; and determining whether the pre-defined output value matchesthe second output value.

Determining whether the particular values for the one or more parameterscomprise a valid solution to the challenge can include identifying anumber of times that the particular values for the one or moreparameters have been received in requests from the client computingdevice or from other client computing devices, and can further includedetermining that the particular values for the one or more parameters donot comprise a valid solution to the challenge in response to adetermination that the number of times that the particular values havebeen received in requests exceeds a replay limit value that identifies amaximum number of times that values for the one or more parameters arepermitted to be accepted as a valid solution to the challenge.

Determining whether the particular values for the one or more parameterscomprise a valid solution to the challenge can include verifying thatthe particular values were generated by the client computing devicewithin a particular period of time after the second code was provided tothe client computing device.

The step of determining whether the particular values for the one ormore parameters comprise a valid solution to the challenge can beperformed at least in part by one or more computers at an edge of anetwork, the one or more computers being separate and geographicallyremote from a web server system from which the first code was originallyserved.

The one or more computers at the edge of the network can include a nodein a content delivery network.

The method can include taking action to initiate the particularweb-based transaction, which can include communicating, from the one ormore computers at the edge of the network and to the web server system,the request from the client computing device to initiate the particularweb-based transaction.

The method can include taking action to prevent initiation of theparticular web-based transaction, which can include choosing to notcommunicate, from the one or more computers at the edge of the networkand to the web server system, the request from the client computingdevice to initiate the particular web-based transaction.

The second code can be generated by the web server system or by a proxycomputing system that is arranged as a proxy to the web server system.

Providing the first code and the second code to the client computingdevice can include inserting the second code into the first code.

The method can further include, for each of a plurality of instances ofelectronic resources that are to be served to one or more clientcomputing devices, generating code that defines a challenge that isunique to the respective instance of the electronic resource, such thatcode for different challenges is generated and provided to respectiveones of the one or more client computing devices along with acorresponding instance of one of the electronic resources.

The method can further include re-coding the first code that defines theat least the portion of the electronic resource, so as to obscure anoperational design of a computing system that generated the first code.The re-coding may not substantially affect a visual presentation of theelectronic resource when the electronic resource is executed at theclient computing device. Executing the electronic resource at the clientcomputing device can include interpreting the electronic resource at theclient computing device.

Re-coding the first code that defines the at least the portion of theelectronic resource can include at least one of changing names offunctions in the first code and changing values of attributes in thefirst code that specify properties of one or more elements in theelectronic resource.

The particular web-based transaction can include a transaction to modifya listing of items in an online shopping cart (e.g., add to cart, removefrom cart), a transaction to transfer money between different accounts,a transaction to create an account, a transaction to login to anaccount, or a transaction to modify settings associated with an account.

In some implementations, a second computer-implemented method isprovided. The method can include receiving, at a computing system andover a network from a client computing device, a request to initiate aweb-based transaction, the request including values for one or moreparameters that are presented as a solution to a challenge that wasprovided to the client computing device. A determination can be made asto whether the values in the request comprise a valid solution to thechallenge that was provided to the client computing device. In responseto determining that the values in the request comprise a valid solutionto the challenge, the method can include coordinating with a web serversystem to initiate the web-based transaction. The method can include, inresponse to determining that the values in the request comprise aninvalid solution to the challenge, to block the request to initiate theweb-based transaction from being communicated to the web server systemso as to prevent initiation of the web-based transaction by the webserver system.

These and other implementations can include one or more of the followingfeatures.

Determining whether the values in the request comprise a valid solutionto the challenge can include parsing the request to identify apre-defined hash value that was provided to the client computing devicealong with the challenge; using a pre-defined hash function to compute asecond hash value based on the values for the one or more parametersincluded in the request; and determining whether the second has valuematches the pre-defined hash value.

The step of determining whether the values in the request comprise avalid solution to the challenge can be performed at least in part by oneor more computers at an edge of the network, the one or more computersbeing separate and geographically remote from a web server system fromwhich the first code was originally served.

The values for the one or more parameters can be specified in auniversal resource indicator (URI) of the request.

Determining whether the values in the request comprise a valid solutionto the challenge can include identifying a number of times that thevalues for the one or more parameters have been received in requestsfrom the client computing device or from other client computing devices.

The computing system can be further configured to determine that thevalues for the one or more parameters do not comprise a valid solutionto the challenge in response to a determination that the number of timesthat the particular values have been received in requests exceeds areplay limit value that identifies a maximum number of times that thevalues for the one or more parameters are permitted to be accepted as avalid solution to the challenge.

Some implementations include a third computer-implemented method. Themethod can include obtaining, at a computing system, web code for a webpage that is to be served to a client computing device. Web code for theweb page can be modified by inserting into the web code additional,executable code that defines a challenge to be solved by the clientcomputing device. The additional, executable code can be arranged tocause the client computing device to search for values for one or moreparameters that comprise a solution to the challenge by iterativelytesting different values of the one or more parameters as possiblesolutions until particular values are determined to satisfy one or moreconstraints associated with the challenge. The modified web code,including the additional, executable code, can be transmitted over anetwork and to the client computing device. The method can identify thatthe client computing device has generated a valid solution to thechallenge, and in response, action can be taken to initiate a web-basedtransaction requested by the client computing device.

These and other implementations can include one or more of the followingfeatures.

The web code can be modified by the computing system. The computingsystem can be arranged as a proxy to a web server system, the proxybeing separate from the computing system.

Portions of the web code can be randomly transformed into re-coded webcode by a web server system that hosts the web code and from which theweb code originated.

Identifying that the client computing device has generated a validsolution to the challenge can include receiving an indication that theclient computing device has generated the valid solution from one ormore computers that are part of a content distribution network, the oneor more computers being separate and remote from the computing system.

The solution to the challenge can include a message that, when hashedaccording to a pre-defined hash function, correctly results in apre-defined hash value.

Some implementations can include a computing system for constructing andvalidating a challenge to improve computer security. The system caninclude one or more of a server subsystem, a challenge generator, acommunications interface, and a challenge validator. The serversubsystem can serve electronic content to client computing devices andcan be configured to perform web transactions in response to requestsfrom the client computing devices. The challenge generator can generatechallenge code for execution by the client computing devices, thechallenge code arranged to cause the client computing devices todetermine values for one or more parameters that comprise solutions tochallenges defined by the challenge code. The communications interfacecan transmit the electronic content from the server subsystem and thechallenge code from the challenge generator over a network and to theclient computing devices. The communications interface can further beconfigured to receive requests to perform web transactions from theclient computing devices. The challenge validator can (i) identify, inthe requests from the client computing devices to perform the webtransactions, values that are presented in the requests as solutions tothe challenges, (ii) determine whether the identified values are validsolutions to the challenges, and (iii) communicate with the serversubsystem to cause performance of the requested web transactions inresponse to a determination that the identified values are validsolutions to the challenges.

These and other implementations can include one or more of the followingfeatures.

The challenge validator can be further configured to prevent theperformance of the requested web transactions in response todeterminations that the identified values are invalid solutions to thechallenges.

The system can further include an anti-replay module, the anti-replaymodule configured to determine numbers of times that values presented inthe requests as solutions to the challenges have previously beenpresented in other requests as solutions to the challenges. Theanti-replay module can also coordinate with the challenge validator toprevent the performance of the requested web transactions in response toa determination that the numbers of times that values presented in therequests as solutions to the challenges have exceeded a maximum numberof times that the values are usable.

Some implementations include one or more non-transitorycomputer-readable media having instructions stored thereon that, whenexecuted by one or more computers, cause performance of operations. Theoperations can include receiving, at a computing system, first code thatdefines at least a portion of an electronic resource that is to beserved to a client computing device; generating second code that definesa challenge to be solved by the client computing device, the second codearranged to cause the client computing device to determine values forone or more parameters that comprise a solution to the challenge,wherein the values for the one or more parameters that comprise thesolution to the challenge are required for the client computing deviceto make valid requests to initiate one or more web-based transactions;providing, to the client computing device, the first code that definesthe at least the portion of the electronic resource and the second codethat defines the challenge to be solved by the client computing device;receiving a request from the client computing device to initiate aparticular web-based transaction, the request including particularvalues for the one or more parameters that comprise a possible solutionto the challenge; determining whether the particular values for the oneor more parameters comprise a valid solution to the challenge; andtaking action to initiate the particular web-based transaction or to notinitiate the particular web-based transaction based on whether theparticular values for the one or more parameters are determined tocomprise a valid solution to the challenge.

Some implementations can include one or more non-transitorycomputer-readable media having instructions stored thereon that, whenexecuted by one or more computers, cause performance of operations. Theoperations can include receiving, at a computing system and over anetwork from a client computing device, a request to initiate aweb-based transaction, the request including values for one or moreparameters that are presented as a solution to a challenge that wasprovided to the client computing device; determining whether the valuesin the request comprise a valid solution to the challenge that wasprovided to the client computing device; and in response to determiningthat the values in the request comprise a valid solution to thechallenge, coordinating with a web server system to initiate theweb-based transaction, wherein the computing system is configured, inresponse to determining that the values in the request comprise aninvalid solution to the challenge, to block the request to initiate theweb-based transaction from being communicated to the web server systemso as to prevent initiation of the web-based transaction by the webserver system.

Some implementations can include one or more non-transitorycomputer-readable media having instructions stored thereon that, whenexecuted by one or more computers, cause performance of operations. Theoperations can include obtaining, at a computing system, web code for aweb page that is to be served to a client computing device; modifyingthe web code for the web page by inserting into the web code additional,executable code that defines a challenge to be solved by the clientcomputing device, the additional, executable code arranged to cause theclient computing device to search for values for one or more parametersthat comprise a solution to the challenge by iteratively testingdifferent values of the one or more parameters as possible solutionsuntil particular values are determined to satisfy one or moreconstraints associated with the challenge; transmitting the modified webcode, including the additional, executable code, over a network and tothe client computing device; identifying, at the computing system, thatthe client computing device has generated a valid solution to thechallenge; and in response to identifying that the client computingdevice has generated a valid solution to the challenge, taking action toinitiate a web-based transaction requested by the client computingdevice.

System Overview

Turning to FIG. 1, a conceptual flow diagram is depicted of an exampleprocess 100 for serving a web page with a challenge to be solved by aclient computing device, and determining whether to perform a webtransaction based on the validity of a solution presented by the client.The process 100 in FIG. 1 is intended to generally illustrate how aclient challenge may be constructed, served, and validated, butcorresponding stages of the process 100 are described in greater detailin the description of other ones of the figures, including FIGS. 4 and5, for example.

The process 100 can begin at Stage A (108), where a user at clientcomputer 102 makes a request for a webpage (shopping.html) from ane-commerce website. For example, perhaps the user has visited thewebsite for an online book retailer, and has clicked on a link to theshopping.html page, where items can be added to an electronic shoppingcart for the user. The request (e.g., an HTTP request) is transmitted toa set of web servers 104 that hosts the retailer's website. The retailermay be sensitive to the possibility of attacks from botnets, such asdistributed DoS attacks, and may have implemented user-agent (client)challenges as a mechanism to deter botnets from launching such attacksthat could harm the retailer's online presence. Accordingly, before theshopping.html webpage is served to the client computer, it may besupplemented with a challenge.

At stage B (110), the web servers 104 can generate a challenge to serveto the client computer along with the shopping.html page. In someimplementations, the challenge may be in the form of a JavaScriptprogram that is automatically run by the client device 102 when it loadsthe webpage in a web browser, for example. A user interacting with thewebpage may not even be alerted to the fact that the challenge code isbeing run or that the challenge has been completed, as the challenge maybe configured to be run as a background process in some implementations.Generally, the challenge may be arranged to allow the client computer102 to discover a solution to the challenge by running the challengecode and expending a certain amount of computational effort and time insearching for the solution. In order for the client computer 102 tosubmit a valid request to initiate a transaction from the shopping.htmlpage, a valid solution to the challenge may be required with therequest. The challenge may therefore be provided to the client computer102 to substantially slow the rate at which valid requests can be madefrom the client computer 102, so that the client 102 could not beleveraged in a DDoS attack, for example, to flood the web servers 104with requests to perform web transactions.

In some implementations, parameters for the challenge can be generatedrandomly. One type of challenge that may be employed is a hashingchallenge in which the client computer is given the output of a hash,and is instructed to determine, by brute force, the input message to thehash that resulted in the pre-defined output. For example, the webservers 104 may randomly choose a key and a message for a hash, and maydetermine a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) value that isan output of the hashing algorithm given the input key and messageparameters. To implement the challenge, the web servers may inject codeinto the shopping.html page to cause the client computer 102 to tryevery value in a range of values as possible messages that render thecorrect HMAC value from the hashing algorithm. The message value thatgenerates the correct HMAC value is then the solution to the challenge.Certain hashing algorithms, such as the SHA-2 algorithm, can serve aseffective challenges due to their non-reversibility and anti-collisionproperties that make it extremely difficult to short-circuit thechallenge and determine a solution other than by brute forcetrial-and-error of a range of possible messages.

With the challenge generated, at stage C (112), the shopping.html pageand the challenge are served to the client computer 102. In someimplementations, the challenge may be provided as in-line code directlyin the shopping webpage, although the challenge may also be indirectlyreferenced by the shopping webpage and served in a second wave ofcontent, for example. FIG. 1 further shows that, in someimplementations, the shopping page and the challenge can be served via acontent delivery network (CDN) 106. For example, operators of the onlineshopping website may have partnered with operators of the CDN 106 toallow content from the shopping website to be delivered through anetwork of distributed servers on the CDN 106, so as to increase theavailability of content, reduce response times, and generally achievebetter performance than what the retailer's own servers 104 may havebeen capable of.

At stage D (114), the client computer 104 may run the challenge codeprovided with the web page to determine a solution to the challenge. Insome implementations, the solution may already be determined by the timethe user selects to initiate a web transaction. For example, at stage E(116), the user selects the “Add to Cart” function on the shopping page.Selection of this function causes the client computer 102 to make arequest to the web servers 104 to perform the function to add the user'sselected item(s) to his or her shopping cart. The request can includethe solution to the challenge, as well as other parameters that may beused to verify that the solution is accurate and that the challenge islegitimate (e.g., that the challenge has not been manipulated). Beforethe “Add to Cart” request actually reaches the web servers 104, however,the request may be validated by the CDN 106 at an edge of the network.Although the web server 104 may do the validation itself in someimplementations, it can also be advantageous to validate with servers atthe CDN 106 so as to reduce the volume of requests handled by the originweb servers 104. Servers in the CDN 106 may filter out invalid requestsand block them from the web server 104, so that expensive transactionslike “Add to Cart” are not carried out needlessly.

At stage F (118), the CDN 106 determines whether the request is valid,including verifying the accuracy of the solution determined by theclient computer 102. In some implementations the CDN 106 may also checka signature included with the request from the client computer 102 toverify that the challenge was generated by a trustworthy source and hasnot been manipulated. The CDN 106 can also refer to an anti-replay table124, to ensure that the solution to a particular challenge has not beensubmitted in previous requests over a period of time. One object of theanti-replay table 124 is to ensure that attackers cannot re-use thesolution to a challenge more than a pre-determined number of times, suchas once. Thus, even if a solution to a challenge is technicallyaccurate, the request may still be deemed invalid if it is the second,third, or fourth time, for example, that the solution to the challengehas been submitted by either the client computer 102 or other clientcomputers.

Depending on whether the request is determined to be valid, the process100 can proceed to either allow or deny the request. If the request isdeemed valid, then CDN 106 at stage G1 (120 a) forwards the request tothe web servers 104, and at stage H (122), the web servers 104 performthe requested “Add to Cart” transaction. But if the request is notdeemed valid (e.g., if the solution is invalid, or if the solutionviolated anti-replay rules), the request is denied at stage G2 (120 b).In the case where the request is denied, the transaction is notperformed and the request may not even be communicated to the webservers 104.

FIG. 2 depicts a timeline 200 over which various client computingdevices have submitted requests including challenge solutions to aserver system 204. The timeline 200 conceptually depicts particularrequests may be accepted and others denied. For example, at time T1, theservers 204 provide content to a first client 202 a. In response, thefirst client 202 a solves a first challenge included in the content, andsubmits a request to initiate a web transaction (e.g., to add items toan electronic shopping cart). The solution is accurate, and otheraspects of the request are verified. The servers 204 thus accept thefirst request from the first client 202 a so that the requestedtransaction can be performed.

Later, at time T2, the first client 202 a re-submits a request includingthe same solution to the first challenge. The servers 204 may check ananti-replay log and find that the solution or the challenge has alreadybeen submitted at an earlier time, and for that reason the request maybe deemed invalid. Then, at time T3, a second client computer 202 b isserved content including a new, second challenge. Rather than solvingthe challenge that it was provided, the second client 202 b submits acounterfeit solution, such as a solution to a challenge that wasillegitimately generated by attackers in advance of the second challengebeing served. The servers 204 may detect that a signature associatedwith the solution is invalid, indicating that the solution and/orchallenge may have been manipulated. Accordingly, request at time T3 isnot accepted. Finally, at time T4, a third client computer 202 c isserved a third challenge with parameters that are different from eitherof challenges 1 or 2. The third client 202 c may be infected withmalware and under the control of a botnet. In another attempt to subvertthe challenge, the client 3 does not wait to determine a solution to thethird challenge, but instead submits a solution to the first challengethat was provided to the first client computer 202 a at time T1.However, because solutions to the first challenge have already beenincluded in requests to the servers 204, the request made by the thirdclient 202 c at time T4 is denied. Accordingly, FIG. 2 generallyillustrates how various safeguards may be implemented to ensure theintegrity of challenges. The host server 204 can validate requests bynot only checking whether a solution proffered in a request is accurate,but also by checking that a challenge and solution are not beingreplayed, and by checking that the challenge has not been manipulated.

Referring now to FIG. 3, a schematic diagram is shown that conceptuallyillustrates the topography of an example computer network 300 over whichcontent can be communicated between origin web servers 302 and clientcomputing devices via a security intermediary and a content deliverynetwork (CDN) 306. Generally, the diagram in FIG. 3 is provided as aframework to describe various manners in which the methods, systems,devices, and other techniques described herein may be arranged toimplement user-agent (client) challenges for the improvement of websecurity. Some of the figures show, by way of example, how variousstages of processing for these techniques may be carried out byparticular components of the network 300, such as by origin web servers302, security intermediary 304, CDN servers 308, or client devices 310.However, the particular configurations described in these drawings areprovided as examples only. In some implementations, certain of theprocessing stages may occur at other ones of the network components thanthe components that are explicitly provided in the figures, or may bedistributed among multiple components.

As shown in FIG. 3, electronic content (i.e., electronic resources, suchas web pages), may be transmitted to client devices using a contentdelivery network (CDN) 306. The CDN 306, along with the origin webservers 302 and the security intermediary 304 can be geographicallyseparated and physically distinct from the client computing devices 310that form endpoints of the network 300. Accordingly, the origin servers302, security intermediary 304, and CDN 306 are all shown as beinglocated at least partially within the cloud 312. Thus, from theperspective of one of the client computing devices 310, request andresponses may appear to be sent and received generally to and from anetwork in the cloud 312, although distinct components within thenetwork may handle different aspects of processing communications withthe client computing device 310. The client computing devices 310 may beany of various types of computing devices that may communicate over anetwork, such as mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets, wearables),notebook computers, or desktop computers. The client computing devices310 may, for example, use web browsing applications to access and toexecute web pages or other content over the internet or other network.The web browsing applications may have a JavaScript engine, for example,that can run challenges written in JavaScript or other suitablelanguages.

The CDN 306 can include a series of distributed servers 308 in datacenters at a plurality of geographically dispersed locations. Differentindividual servers 308 or groups of servers 308 may each represent anode in the CDN 306 at an edge of the network 300. The nodes may belocated at the edges of the network 300 because they are proximate tothe client computer devices 310, and are thus closer in the network 300to the client devices 310 than are other components such as the originweb servers 302. The CDN 306 may be configured to deliver content hostedby the origin web servers 302 to the client computing devices 310 withhigh availability and performance. The servers 308 in the CDN 306 canact as intelligent intermediaries between the origin web servers 302 andthe client computing devices 310. For example, when a client device 310submits a request for content on a domain hosted by the origin webservers 302, the CDN 306 can intelligently direct the request to theservers 308 at a particular node of the CDN 306 that is determined to bebest situated to handle the request. An optimal node of the CDN 306 tohandle the request may be selected based on factors such as the distancebetween the node and the requesting client device 310, the presentavailability of the node, and the nature of the particular content beingrequested. For example, the optimal node may be the node that is locatedclosest to the client device 310 that submitted a request (e.g., asmeasured by the expected time for communications to be transmittedbetween the node and the client, or as measured by the node that is thefewest number of network hops away from the client). The optimal node ofthe CDN 306 can process the request and determine how to handle it in anefficient manner. In some implementations, each of the nodes 306 maycache content from the origin web servers 302, so that the nodes mayrespond to requests from client computing devices 310 with cachedcontent, when the requested content has been cached, rather than pingingthe origin web servers 302 to obtain the content for each request. Inthis way, the CDN 306 can significantly reduce the load on the originweb servers 302 due to the CDN's 306 distributed network of servers 308handling requests for popular, cached content. The CDN 306 can also helpto improve the response times for handling requests due to theadditional computing capacity provided by the CDN's servers 308, and thedistribution of requests to optimally selected nodes that may be locatedclosest to the respective client computing devices 310 that have maderequests over the network 300.

The origin web servers 302 may include a system of one or more computers300 from which web content requested by the client computing devices 310originates. The origin web servers 302 may serve various types ofcontent, such as web code (e.g., HTML, JavaScript, Cascading StyleSheets) for web pages, media files, applications, and more. The originweb servers 302 may also execute server-side applications that powerservices delivered to the client computing devices 310. For example, theorigin web servers 302 may host an e-commerce website. The servers 302may host text, web code, images, and other media files that are part ofthe website, and may run various server-side applications to dynamicallygenerate content specific to particular requests.

In some implementations, the network 300 may include a securityintermediary 304. The security intermediary 304 may include one or morecomputers that are located in the network 300 between and distinct fromthe origin web servers 302 and the client devices 310. In someimplementations, the security intermediary 304 may be proximate to theorigin web servers 302, and may be located between the servers 308 ofthe CDN 306 and the origin web servers 302. For example, the securityintermediary 304 may be arranged as a reverse proxy or a full proxy infront of the web server 102. When arranged as a reverse proxy, thesecurity intermediary 304 may intercept all or a portion of incomingcommunications for the origin web servers 302 (e.g., all communicationsforwarded from the CDN 306, but not client requests that have beenblocked by the CDN 306), and may process all or a portion of outboundcommunications from the origin web servers 302. In some implementations,the security intermediary 304 may operate in coordination with varioussites at multiple domains, which sites may be hosted on a common set oforigin servers 302, or on respective sets of origin servers for each ofthe domains/sites. The security intermediary 304 may be implemented ondedicated computers that are physically distinct from the computers forthe origin web servers 302. In some implementations, the securityintermediary 304 may be implemented, not on physically separatehardware, but as one or more modules on the origin web servers 302. Insome implementations, one or more security intermediaries 304 may beprovided at all or particular ones of the nodes in the CDN 306 (notshown), and may be implemented as software modules within the servers308 of the CDN 306 or as dedicated hardware co-located with the servers308 of the CDN 306.

Generally, the security intermediary 304 may be programmed to performone or more types of transformation on electronic content that is to beserved to the client computing devices 310. For example, the securityintermediary 304 may re-code content that is outputted from the originweb servers 302, and may apply reverse transformations to requests madefrom a re-coded web page on a client computing device 310 so that therequest is recognizable by the origin web servers 302. Similarly, forsecurity intermediaries 304 distributed in the CDN 306 (not shown), thesecurity intermediary 304 may re-code content to be served to the clientdevices 310 from the CDN servers 308, and may apply reversetransformations to requests from the client devices 310 from a re-codedweb page so that the request may be recognized by the CDN servers 308.In some implementations, each security intermediary 304 may beconfigured to perform operations like those carried out by thetransformation module in system 400 (FIG. 4) or by the security servers702 a-n of system 700 (FIG. 7). For example, the security intermediary304 may re-code portions of the web code for a web page that is to beserved to a client device 310. The re-coding can involve applying randomtransformations to select portions of the original code, so as toobscure an operational design of the origin web servers 302 and/or theCDN servers 308. In some implementations, the security intermediary 304may randomize elements of a web page's implicit API, such as form names,attribute values, and hyperlink addresses, so as to interfere with theability of malware at the client devices 310 to exploit the implicit APIto perform fraudulent transactions or other malicious actions. Thesecurity intermediary 304 may re-code content differently each time itserved, for example, to create a moving target that may prevent botsfrom predicting how a page will be re-coded in any particular instance.In some implementations, the security intermediary 304 may re-codecontent in other manners as well, such as inserting decoy code,randomizing HTML tag names, and splitting form fields into multiplefields that each accept a portion of content typed by a user. In someimplementations, the security intermediary 304 may instrument electroniccontent that is to be served to a client device 310 with code (e.g.,JavaScript) programmed to collect information about the client computingdevice 310 that executes the content, and about interactions with thecontent at the client computing device 310. The instrumented code maythen report the collected information over a network to the securityintermediary 304 or to another portion of a computing system foranalysis.

Recall that in the example process 100 depicted in FIG. 1, the challengewas generated at a set of origin web servers. The shopping.html webpagewas supplemented with the challenge code at the origin web servers aswell, and the supplemented code was then served to the client computer anode in a content delivery network. When the client computer thereaftersolved the challenge and submitted a request, the node in the contentdelivery network validated the solution, and took action to either allowor deny the request based on the determined validity of the solution.However, various stages in the process 100 could alternatively takeplace at different ones of the components depicted in network 300 ofFIG. 3. For example, the challenge may be generated and inserted intoelectronic content being served at any one of the origin web servers302, the security intermediary 304, and one or more nodes of the contentdelivery network 306. Similarly, any one or more of these components maybe configured to validate a solution provided by a client computingdevice 310. In some implementations, a security intermediary 304proximate to the origin web servers 304, or proximate to the nodes inthe CDN 306, may both generate and insert the challenge, and may alsovalidate solutions to the challenge from client devices 310. In someimplementations, the origin web servers 302 or the CDN servers 308 maygenerate and insert the challenge, and validate solutions. In someimplementations, in the absence of a content delivery network 306, asecurity intermediary 304 acting as a proxy to the origin web servers302 may implement challenges and validate their solutions. For example,the security intermediary 304 may intercept an outbound web page fromthe origin servers 302, may generate and insert a challenge into the webpage, and may then transmit the re-coded web page that includes code forthe challenge to one of the client computing devices 310. When theclient device 310 submits a solution to the challenge, the securityintermediary can again intercept the communication before it reaches theweb servers 302, and can determine whether the solution is valid. If thesolution is determined to be valid, the communication can be provided tothe web servers 302. If not, the communication may be blocked. In someimplementations, the client computers 310 can communicate with theorigin web servers 302 directly, without either a security intermediary304 or the CDN 306. In these implementations, the origin web servers 302may generate the challenge, supplement the content to be served with thechallenge, and also determine whether solutions from the client devices310 are valid. If a solution is determined to be valid, the web servers302 may act on the request (e.g., may initiate a web transactionspecified in the request). If a solution is not determined to be valid,the web servers 302 may not respond as requested. For example, the webserver 302 may return an error page to the client device 310 indicatingthat the requested transaction could not be performed.

FIG. 4 is a flowchart of an example process 400 for implementing andvalidating user-agent challenges, such as may be used to frustrate theability of botnets to carry out denial of service attacks. Generally,the process 400 can generate a user-agent challenge that a client devicemust solve in order to submit a valid request to a web server. The timerequired to solve the challenge may slow the rate at which requests canbe made by client devices under the control of a botnet. Further, theprocess 400 may provide various safeguards against the possibility ofre-play attacks, manipulated solutions, or solutions to fraudulentchallenges. The process 400 is described by way of an example withrespect to an implementation involving servers from a content deliverynetwork, origin web servers, and a security intermediary configured as areverse proxy to the origin web servers. However, as discussed abovewith respect to FIG. 3, the process 300 can also be carried out withother network arrangements, such as arrangements in which the clientcomputer directly communicates with the security intermediary, originservers, or both, without the presence of a distributed content deliverynetwork.

The process 400 can begin at stage 402, where a client computer makes arequest for a web page. For example, the client computer may submit anHTTP request for the homepage of an online banking website. In someimplementations, other types of electronic resources may be requestedsuch as media objects, text, databases, and applications. The requestedresource may be capable of execution at the client computer. In someimplementations, the resource may include functions that allow a user tosubmit a request to initiate one or more web transactions. For example,the homepage of the banking website may be executed in a web browsingapplication at the client device, and the page may include an accountlogin function. The user may input his credential into the loginfunction, and submit the credentials with a request to the originservers to log into the user's personal banking account.

At stage 404, the request for the web page is received at a particularnode of servers in a content delivery network. The particular node mayhave been chosen among a plurality of nodes in the network based onfactors such as the distance of the client computer to the node. Forexample, the CDN node closest to the client may be chosen to handle therequest so as to minimize response times. The CDN may check certainparameters of the request to determine a manner in which to handle therequest. For example, as shown in FIG. 4, the CDN servers may forwardthe request to the origin servers or to the security intermediary. Insome implementations (not shown in the flowchart), the CDN servers maydetermine that it may respond to the request using cached content,thereby obviating the need to contact the origin servers to obtain thecontent. In such implementations, stages 406-414 of the process 400, forexample, may then be performed at the CDN node (with the CDN servers, adistributed security intermediary proximate to the CDN node, or both).

At stage 406, an origin web server receives the client's request, andaccesses the electronic resource indicated by the request. For example,in response to a request for the homepage of the banking website, theorigin server may identify or dynamically generate web code for thehomepage that is to be served to the client computer. The web page mayinclude multiple components that collectively define a complete userexperience, such as markup language (e.g., HTML), scripts (e.g.,JavaScript), style sheets (e.g., CSS), and media files (e.g., JPEGimages, video, vector graphics). At stage 406, the web server mayinitially access only particular ones of the components, such as HTMLcode that is to be supplemented with a client-side script for theuser-agent challenge.

At stage 408, the web servers (or security intermediary) generates thechallenge that is to be provided to the client computer. In someimplementations, different challenges may be generated to accompany theresponses to each of a plurality of requests from one or more clientcomputers. For example, the parameters for a challenge may be randomlydetermined by the web server, to minimize the likelihood of a commonchallenge being provided in response to multiple different requests. Insome implementations, the challenge parameters may be pre-defined beforethe web servers receive the specific request from the client computer.Pre-defining the challenge parameters may be advantageous to minimizethe response time from the server, although the parameters may begenerated during runtime after the specific request is received in someimplementations.

Generally, the challenge may be programmed so as to introduce a non-zerotime delay in the ability of the client computer to submit a validrequest from the web page for the servers to initiate one or more webtransactions. In some implementations, the challenge may comprise ascript that is configured to be automatically run by the client computerwhen the client loads the web page. The script may be run in thebackground without any need for the user to select a control to initiatethe script. For example, the user may type the address of the bankingwebsite into a web browser, submit a request for the page, and wait afew seconds as the page loads. As the page loads, or at some time afterthe page has completed loading, the browser can automatically run thescript to solve the challenge. The user may begin his normal routine oftyping a username and password into an “account login” form on the webpage, and by the time the user selects to submit the login information,the browser may have already determined the solution to the challenge.The solution can be submitted in the request to login to the account,for example. If the solution has not yet been determined by the time theuser selects to submit the account login information, the browser maydelay submission of the request until the challenge is solved. In someimplementations, the challenge may be programmed to not run untilcertain events are detected to have occurred on the client computer. Forexample, the client may not begin working on the challenge until theuser selects a control that triggers the challenge to be run, such as acontrol requesting that a particular web transaction (e.g., accountlogin) be initiated.

In some implementations, the challenge may be designed so as to ensurethat the client computer cannot shortcut a prescribed manner fordetermining a solution to the challenge. The challenge may intentionallybe a computationally expensive problem for the client computer to solve,in order to create the desired delay between the time when the web pagecode is received by the client computer and the time at which a validsolution is determined. If bots were able to somehow break thechallenge, and determine a valid solution without the time delay, thechallenge may be less effective at heading off certain attacks, in someimplementations. One type of challenge that may be used in this regardis a hashing challenge. In a hashing challenge, the client computer maybe provided with a hash value of an unknown message that has been hashedaccording to a particular algorithm. The challenge may be solved bydetermining the message value that yields the pre-defined hash value.Because the particular hashing algorithm may be non-reversible, noalgorithmic shortcut may exist to compute the original message valuefrom the hash value. Rather, the challenge code provided to the clientcomputer may instruct the client to determine a solution by “bruteforce,” such as by computing the hash of every possible message valuewithin a range of values until the computed hash matches a particularpre-defined hash value. In addition to being non-reversible, the hashingfunction may further be collisionless or collision resistant, in thatthe likelihood of two different message values yielding the same hashvalue is extremely small. As such, the pre-defined hash value may onlyresult from the hash of a single message value.

By way of example, one algorithm that may be employed in the challengeis the SHA-2 hashing algorithm. The SHA-2 algorithm is a cryptographichash that was developed by the United States National Security Agency(NSA). The SHA-2 algorithm has been extensively tested and analyzed bydata security experts, and is recognized as being very robust in termsof its non-reversibility and anti-collision properties. Other suitablealgorithms may also be used in some implementations.

One challenge based on the SHA-2 algorithm can be defined by thefollowing equation (Equation 1), as prescribed in RFC 2104:h _(p)=SHA2((r _(p) ⊕opad)

SHA2((r _(p) ⊕ipad)

r′ _(p))  Equation 1

The following operators are used in Equation 1:

Concatenation

⊕ Exclusive or (XOR)

In Equation 1, a keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) h iscalculated based on the parameters r and r′. The opad and ipad valuesare pre-defined constants. The first parameter r represents the “key”for the HMAC calculation. The second parameter r′ represents the“message” value for the HMAC calculation. In some implementations, increating a challenge to serve to the client computer, the web serversmay generate random values for the key r and the message r′. To createdifferent challenges, such as may be served to different clientcomputers, the web server can generate different r and r′ values foreach challenge. Polymorphic challenges can thus be created by permutingthe r and r′ values, so that the solution to one challenge created witha first set of inputs would not be re-usable with other challengescreated with different sets of input values. In some implementations,the degree of effort required by the client computer to solve the bruteforce challenge can be adjusted based on the size/length of the message.Longer messages, for example, may result in challenges that are morecomputationally expensive to solve, and that therefore would be expectedto take the client computer a longer time to solve, on average.

In some implementations, the challenge for the client computer can be todetermine the message value r′ that, when used with the key r inEquation 1, yields an HMAC value h that matches a pre-determine HMACvalue. For example, the web server (or security intermediary or CDNserver) may randomly generate input parameters r and r′ for Equation 1.The web server may then compute the pre-determined HMAC value h usinginput parameters r and r′. Computer code for the challenge can then begenerated. In some implementations, the computer code may be one or morescripts that are configured to be run at the client computer inconjunction with the requested web page. For example, the challenge maybe provided as a script in JavaScript, or in any other form that theclient computer is capable of running. The computer code for thechallenge may specify the input key parameter r and the pre-determinedHMAC value h. To solve the challenge, the computer code may include aprogram that, when run, causes the client computer to repeatedly trydifferent message values in computing an HMAC value using Equation 1 andthe key value r that was provided by the web server. The solution to thechallenge is then the message value r′ whose corresponding HMAC valuematches the pre-determined HMAC value h that was provided to the clientcomputer by the web server. The challenge thus requires the clientcomputer to use a brute force approach to determine the correct messagevalue r′. As the size of the message value increases, the clientcomputer may be required to perform more iterations in testing candidatemessage values until the correct message is found. Moreover, Equation 1is premised on the SHA-2 hashing algorithm and is non-reversible, thereshould be no practical way to shortcut the challenge to determine thecorrect message value. Moreover, because of the SHA-2 algorithm'santi-collision property, the only message value r that will bear thecorrect, pre-determined HMAC value h is the message value r that wasearlier determined by the web server to construct the challenge.

At stage 410, the process 400 supplements the web page that is to beserved to the client computer with the challenge code that the clientcan run to solve the challenge. In some implementations, the challengecode may be inserted directly into web code that defines the web page.For example, when the challenge code is provided in JavaScript, thechallenge code may be inserted into an HTML file for the web page. Insome implementations, the challenge code may not be directly insertedinto the web code for the web page as in-line code. For example, areference to a separate file on the web server that includes thechallenge code may be provided in the web code. The client computer mayparse the web code, identify the reference to the file, and download thechallenge code separately from the web code. In some implementations, asshown in FIG. 4, the web server or security intermediary may supplementthe web code with the challenge code. In some implementations, a CDNserver may supplement the web code with the challenge code.

At stage 412, the process 400 codes the requested web page to includesecurity countermeasures in addition to the challenge code. In someimplementations, the additional countermeasures are included by the webserver in the first instance when the web page is served. In someimplementations, however, initial web code served by the web server canbe re-coded to include the additional security countermeasures. Forexample, a security intermediary that is proximate to the web server(e.g., as a proxy to the web server) and/or a security intermediary thatis proximate to a CDN server, may intercept web code transmitted by theweb server, and may modify the intercepted code to incorporate theadditional countermeasures before the code is provided to the clientcomputer. The additional security countermeasures may be configured toimprove the security of the web page in various manners. Somecountermeasures, for example, may obscure the operational design of theweb server by applying randomized transformations to portions of thecode. For example the web page's implicit API, such as form names,attribute values, and hyperlink addresses, may be randomized so as tointerfere with the ability of malware at the client devices 310 toexploit the implicit API. The changes to the code may be made in amanner that does not disrupt either the functionality or the appearanceof the web page from the user's perspective, but that nonethelessprotects the code from being exploited by alien software (e.g., malware)on the client computer. For example, changes to the implicit API maymake elements of the web page difficult to properly recognize. Moreover,if other elements are added, scrambled, deleted, or otherwise modifiedin the web page code, bots may be unable to properly locate the formfields and APIs necessary to properly initiate a desired webtransaction. The re-coding may also be polymorphic, so as to create amoving target for bots that may attempt to analyze how a page has beenre-coded across multiple servings of a web page. By re-coding the webpage randomly, or otherwise differently, each time the page is served,bots may not be able to predict how a page will be re-coded in any giveninstance. Changes in the re-coding across servings can also be made in amanner that defies determination of a pattern to the re-coding.Generally, the process 300 may re-code the web page to add additionalsecurity countermeasures in a like manner as the security servers 702a-n depicted in FIG. 7. In other words, the re-coding stage 412 of theprocess 400 can involve performing techniques like those carried out bythe security servers 702 a-n. In some implementations, thecountermeasures introduced into the web code at this stage can providedefenses against other types of attacks that the challenge code may notbe equipped to handle. For example, inserting challenge code intocontent delivered to client computers may be effective to preventbotnets from carrying out large-scale Distributed Denial of Serviceattacks. But even with the challenge code, a portion of requests fromclients may be deemed valid if a correct solution to a challenge ispresented. Some other countermeasures may prevent other forms of attacksfor these requests that have valid challenge solutions, but that maystill be nefarious (e.g., credential stuffing, cross-site requestforgeries, content spoofing, man-in-the-browser attacks).

At stage 414, the re-coded web page, including the challenge code andthe necessary parameters for solving the challenge, is served to theclient computer. The path to communicate the re-coded page to the clientmay depend on the network configuration. For example, if a securityintermediary proximate to the web server intercepted code from the webserver to inject the challenge code and add other securitycountermeasures, the security intermediary may transmit the re-codedpage over the Internet and to the client computer. If the contentprovider has arranged for distribution of content through a contentdelivery network, the re-coded page may transmitted to the clientcomputer a node of the CDN. For example, servers at a node in the CDNmay receive the re-coded page from the security intermediary, and atstage 416, may forward the page to the client computer.

At stage 418, the client computer can receive the re-coded web pageincluding the challenge, and can proceed to determine a solution to thechallenge. In some implementations, the challenge code can beautomatically run by the client computer without direct involvement by auser. The challenge can even be solved before a user submits a requestto initiate a web transaction, so that the solution is available forimmediate transmission when the user makes the request. If the challengehas not yet been solved, the client computer may continue to run thechallenge until a solution is determined, and may then communicate therequest over the network (e.g., to the web server) upon completion ofthe challenge. In some implementations, the challenge may be programmedto not be run until the occurrence of certain events is detected, suchas a user's selection to submit a request to initiate a particular webtransaction. This approach may be beneficial where computer resourcesare limited, so that the client does not spend unnecessary time andeffort on solving a challenge until it is confirmed that the userintends to request initiation of a web transaction for which a validsolution to the challenge is required.

Stages 418 and 420 are expounded in greater detail in FIG. 5, whichgenerally depicts a flowchart of an example process 500 for solving achallenge at a client computer. In the example process 500, thechallenge to be solved is the determination of a message value r′ thatyields a pre-determined HMAC value h when the message value r′ is usedas an input parameter in Equation 1.

The process 500 can begin at stage 502, when the client computerreceives the re-coded web page along with code for performing the SHA-2hashing challenge based on Equation 1. At stage 504, the clientidentifies the pre-determined HMAC value h and the key value r for thechallenge, which may be specified in the web page code. Recall that thekey value r is a second input parameter to Equation 1, along with themessage value r′. When constructing the challenge, the web server orsecurity intermediary, for example, may have randomly generated thevalues for r and r′, and used those values to compute the pre-determinedHMAC value. The HMAC value h and key value r may be provided to theclient computer, but the r′ value is withheld, so that the clientcomputer can independently determine r′ when executing the challenge.

At stage 506, the process 500 can identify a timestamp t and a signaturevalue s that have been provided in or along with the challenge code.These parameters s and t may be later used by the CDN, a securityintermediary, or the origin web servers as anti-manipulation measuresthat can guard against the possibility of validating solutions tofraudulent challenges, for example. Such measures may also ensure thatsolutions to the challenges are computed and submitted in a timelymanner. For example, one would expect that a solution to a challengewould be determined within minutes of the challenge being served. If,however, bots had preemptively solved a challenge in advance of thechallenge being served, then the anti-manipulation measures may notaccept the solution as being valid (even if the r′ message value istechnically correct). Likewise, challenges that were solved after toolong a delay from the time the challenge was served may indicate aproblem, which the anti-manipulation measures may guard against (e.g.,if a bot saved a challenge for later submission during an attack).

In some implementations, a signing scheme may be an effective mechanismto guard against the types of manipulation discussed above. In such ascheme, the signature value s may be generated using a secret keypossessed only by entities that are deemed trustworthy, such as trustedservers on the CDN, the security intermediary, and/or the origin webservers. Fraudsters who lack the secret key would be unable to spoof achallenge that requires a valid signature to be deemed valid. Forexample, the web server (or CDN or security intermediary) may generate asignature s that is unique to the particular challenge served to theclient computer. The client computer may then return the signature s,along with other necessary parameters, in a request to the web server,CDN, or security intermediary to initiate a web transaction, so that theintegrity of the challenge and solution can be verified.

In some implementations, the signature value may be calculated accordingto the following equation (Equation 2):S _(p)=HMAC(k,h _(p)

t))  Equation 2

As shown above, in Equation 2, the signature value s is calculated usinga hashed-message authentication scheme such as HMAC/SHA-2. The HMACfunction in Equation 2 can be the same HMAC function from Equation 1,for example, but the input parameters are now (i) the secret key k and(ii) the concatenation of the pre-determined HMAC value h with timestampt, rather than (i) the shared key r and (ii) the message value r′, asprovided respectively in Equation 1. In addition to the secret key, thesignature value s is thus also a function of the HMAC value h and thetimestamp t. As such, the signature is uniquely tied to the HMAC value hof each challenge, and also to a particular time t associated with thechallenge. In some implementations, the timestamp t may be a time atwhich the challenge was generated or a time at which the challenge wasprepared to be served to the client computer. The signature s, timestampt, and HMAC value h can all be provided to the client computer with thechallenge code, and can be returned by the client computer when arequest is made to initiate a transaction. The computing system which istasked with validating a solution to the challenge (e.g., the webserver, CDN, or security intermediary) may then use the returnedparameters from the client computer, along with the calculated solutionr′, the shared key r, and the secret key k known to the computing systemto validate that the solution r′.

At stage 508, the client can solve the challenge using a brute-forceapproach to determine a message value r′ whose calculated HMAC valueusing Equation 1 matches the pre-determined HMAC value h provided withthe challenge. The challenge code (e.g., JavaScript) provided by the webserver, for example, may include the necessary code to cause the clientcomputer to run the brute-force approach to solving the challenge. Insome implementations, stage 508 can include the following sub-stagesthat allow a range of the message values to be tested by the clientcomputer in search of the correct message value r′ that comprises asolution to the challenge. At sub-stage 510, an initial test messagevalue rt′ is set to zero. At sub-stage 512, the client calculates theSHA-2 HMAC test value ht using the current value of rt′ (which isinitially zero) according to Equation 1. At sub-stage 514, the clientcompares the calculated HMAC test value ht to the pre-determined HMACvalue h that was provided to the client with the challenge code. If theHMAC test value ht does not match the pre-determined HMAC value h, thenthe process 500 proceeds to stage 516 and increments the HMAC test valueht by one. The process 500 then returns to sub-stage 512 and repeats.When a test value ht is found that matches the pre-determined HMAC valueh, the process 500 ends the loop and proceeds to stage 518.

At stage 518, the client computer stores the message value until it isneeded. For example, the client computer may have automatically executedthe challenge code before a request is made that requires a solution tothe challenge. When the user selects a button or other control on theweb page to transmit information in a form so as to initiate atransaction at the web server, the solution can then be accessed and isreadily available to submit in the request without additional delay.

At stage 520, the client computer submits a request to initiate atransaction (e.g., a request to login to an account, to initiate afinancial transaction, or to add an item to an electronic shoppingcart). The request can include, for example, the calculated HMAC valueas the solution to the challenge, the pre-determined HMAC value h, theshared key value r, the timestamp t, and the signature value h. Eventhough the only one of these values in the request to have beenspecifically computed by the client computer may be the calculated HMACvalue that comprises the solution to the challenge, the other parameterscan be returned to the validating computing system so that the solutioncan be readily validated. In this manner, validation can be stateless,in that the request itself can include all the information necessary toperform the validation (other than the secret key k, for example). Thevalidating computing system thus has no need to correlate thetransaction request with stored information about the challenge that wasprovided to the client computer at an earlier time. Instead, thetransaction request may include all the necessary parameters to validatethe solution determined by the client computer, and all the necessaryparameters for the web server to re-compute the signature value s anddetermine whether it is a valid match to the signature s returned fromthe client computer. If the web server or other portion of a computingsystem that is arranged to evaluate the client's request determines thatthe request is valid, then the client's requested transaction may becarried out. If the web server determines that the request is invalid(e.g., as a result of an incorrect solution or the signature indicatinganother problem with the request), then the client's requestedtransaction may be blocked. At stage 522, the client computer canreceive a response page that indicates whether the transaction wassuccessfully performed.

Referring again to FIG. 4, at stage 420 the client computer submits arequest to perform a web transaction, and the request can include thesolution to the challenge that the client computer has determined. Asdiscussed with respect to stage 520 in FIG. 5, the request may alsoinclude all other non-secret parameters that the web server, CDN, orsecurity intermediary may use to re-construct and validate the solutionto the challenge. In the example depicted in FIG. 4, validation isperformed at a node in the CDN, rather than at the origin web servers orat a security intermediary proximate to the web servers. The CDN serversthemselves may be used to validate the solution, or a distributedsecurity intermediary co-located at the CDN node may validate thesolution in some implementations. In some implementations, one advantagethat may result from pushing the validation operations from the originweb servers to the CDN is that invalid requests can be processed andfiltered out before they ever reach the origin web servers. Thisarrangement can improve security of the web servers by keepingpotentially malicious requests away from the servers, and can alsosignificantly reduce the load on the origin servers by reducing thevolume of traffic arriving at the origin servers. The distribution ofservers in the CDN may also allow the CDN to handle validation of only aportion of the overall volume of requests to a web server at each nodein the CDN, which may be more manageable than if the origin web serverswere to centrally validate the total volume of requests.

The request from the client computer can be validated based on one ormore measures. In some implementations, multiple measures be verified inorder for the request to be deemed valid. If any of the measures is notverified, the request may be deemed invalid. First, the CDN (or theorigin web servers or a security intermediary in some implementations)may verify that the solution to the challenge provided in the request isvalid. In some implementations, the solution can be validated byapplying the client's proffered solution to the HMAC/SHA-2 hashingalgorithm of Equation 1, and verifying that the resulting HMAC valuematches the pre-determined HMAC value h. The pre-determined HMAC value hmay have been originally calculated by the web servers or other portionof a computing system that constructed the challenge, then provided tothe client computer as part of the challenge code. The client computermay then return the pre-determined HMAC value h in its request toinitiate the web transaction, and the CDN can extract the value h fromthe request in order to validate the solution. Note that, in someimplementations, the amount of computational effort involved indetermining the solution to the challenge at the client computer and theamount of computational effort involved in validating the solution(e.g., by the CDN) can be highly asymmetrical. In particular, theclient's effort to determine the solution may be much greater than theCDN's effort to validate the solution. For example, with the HMAC/SHA-2hashing algorithm of Equation 1, the computational burden for the clientcomputer to determine a solution is generally a function of the maximumsize of the message r′. If the size of the message r′ is limited to fourbits, the client may test up to 16 different possible message valuesbefore finding the value that will derive the correct HMAC value h. Ifthe message value was randomly selected with an even probabilitydistribution among each of the possible message values r′, then theclient computer would be expected to test an average of 8 message valuesbefore arriving at the solution. More generally, the averagecomputational burden for the client computer may be calculated asfollows (Equation 3):n=2^(b)/2  Equation 3

In Equation 3, n represents the average number of iterations requiredfor the client computer to find a solution, and b represents the maximumsize of the message value in number of bits. Thus, increasing themaximum size of the message value results in an increase in the averagenumber of iterations required for the client computer to find asolution, and would thus be expected to add a greater delay in the timebefore the client computer can submit a valid request to perform certainweb transactions. In contrast, regardless of the message size, the CDNor other portion of a computing system that validates the solution cangenerally do so in just one iteration by evaluating Equation 1 usingparameters provided in the request from the client computer.

In some implementations, the signature s may be used as a second measureto validate the request from the client computer. Recall that the webserver or other portion of a computing system that generated thechallenge for the client computer may have also generated a signature sand a timestamp t. The signature s may be uniquely associated with theparticular challenge that was provided to the client computer becausethe signature s may partly be a function of one or more parameters thatdefine the challenge. For example, as shown in Equation 2 above, thesignature s may be calculated by determining the HMAC/SHA-2 value of amessage that consists of the pre-determined HMAC value h concatenated tothe timestamp t. The signature s can further depend on the value of asecret key k that is known only to trusted entities such as operators ofthe web servers, security intermediary, and CDN. The signature s can beused in validating the request by re-computing the signature s at theCDN (or other portion of a computing system tasked with validating therequest, such as the origin web servers or security intermediary)according to Equation 2 using parameters returned by the client computerin the request, including the pre-determined HMAC value h and thetimestamp t. If the re-computed signature s matches the signature sreturned from the client in the request, then the signature may bedeemed valid. A valid signature s can indicate that the client computerhas submitted a solution to a legitimate challenge. For example,attackers who attempted to independently generate an unsanctionedchallenged and who attempted to submit a corresponding solution to thechallenge, would be unsuccessful due to an inability to generate a validsignature s. In particular, without the secret key that is possessedonly by trusted agents, the attackers would be unable to generate avalid signature s. Moreover, incorporating the timestamp t into thecomputation of signature s can allow the CDN to ensure that a requestcomplies with one or more time constraints. For example, to prevent botsfrom collecting many challenges over a period of time, determiningsolutions to those challenges, and launching a DoS attack using thesolutions to the accumulated challenges, the CDN may discard as invalidrequests whose timestamps are “stale” (too old). Thus, if more than apre-defined maximum length of time (e.g., 1 hour) has elapsed between atime indicated in the timestamp and a time at which the client submitsthe request to initiate the web transaction, then the request may bedeemed invalid. In some implementations, the request may be deemedinvalid as untimely even if the solution to the challenge correctlygenerates the expected HMAC value h. Moreover, by incorporating thetimestamp t into the signature s, attackers may be prevented fromsubmitting a fraudulent timestamp.

In some implementations, the CDN (or other portion of a computing systemconfigured to validate the request from the client computer) may furthervalidate the request by a third validation measure, which can involvechecking one or more anti-replay safeguards. The anti-replay safeguardscan indicate a number of times that any solution to a particularchallenge has been previously included in requests from one or moreclient computers over a period of time. In some implementations, theanti-replay safeguards can indicate a number of times that a particularsolution to a particular challenge has been previously included inrequests from one or more client computers over a period of time. If thenumber of times that solutions, whether generally or particularly, havebeen submitted for a particular challenge meets or exceeds a pre-definedmaximum number, then the CDN may block the client's request as invalid.In some implementations, a request may be blocked for violatinganti-replay rules even if the request otherwise includes a validchallenge solution and a valid signature. One reason for implementingthese safeguards is to prevent attackers from carrying out replayattacks in which the solutions to one or more challenges are repeatedlyre-used. The safeguards may thus help to prevent a scenario in whichattackers determine a solution to one challenge, and distribute thesolution and other applicable challenge parameters across a network ofinfected devices to carry out an attack without having determined anindividual the solution to respective challenges for each requestsubmitted in the attack. In some implementations, the maximum number oftimes that a solution may be accepted may be set to one, so that anyreplay submissions are rejected. In some implementations, the CDN orother portion of the computing system configured to validate requests,may maintain a log of solutions received in requests from clientcomputers over a period of time. Upon receiving a new request from aclient computer, the CDN can check the log to determine how many times asolution to the particular challenge indicated in the new request hasbeen submitted in prior requests, or a number of times that theparticular solution indicated in the new request has been submitted inprior requests from the same client computer or other client computers.If the number of times meets or exceeds a threshold, then the CDN maydeem the request invalid and may take appropriate action to block therequested transaction from being performed. In some implementations,each node in the CDN may maintain its own anti-replay log. In someimplementations, the CDN may synchronize logs across the various nodesin the CDN, or each of the nodes may access a log stored at acentralized location such as at the origin web servers or at a securityintermediary.

In some implementations, the computational effort involved in checkinganti-replay safeguards can be reduced through the use of caching at theCDN. For example, without caching the CDN (or origin web servers orsecurity intermediary, for example), may be burdened with looking up upone or more parameters for the solution or challenge specified in eachnew request from a client computer in the anti-replay log. Consider animplementation in which the pre-determined HMAC value h is used as ameasure of how many times a particular challenge has been previouslysubmitted for validation. The anti-replay log may have entries for eachHMAC value h received in various requests. To eliminate a need for theCDN to check the log each time a replay request is received, thechallenge code may be programmed to cause the client computer totransmit the pre-determined HMAC value h and the message solution valuer′ as part of the path in the URI (e.g.,http://www.acme.com/addtocart/h/r′/?sku=100456). By transmitting the hand r′ parameters in this manner, the first time that the h value isfound in the anti-replay table, the web server can set the headers inthe response to cause the CDN to cache the response at an edge. Allsubsequent requests for the same URI may then be delivered the sameresponse as was delivered the first time that the h value was found inthe anti-replay log, but without bothering to consult the log again. Themessage value r′ that the client has determined as the solution to thechallenge can be included in the path so that an attacker attempting toreverse engineer the challenge code provided to the client may recognizethat without calculating the value of r′, a valid URI cannot beconstructed.

At stages 424 and 426, the CDN can take appropriate action depending onwhether the request from the client computer is determined to be valid.Generally, if the request is determined to be valid, the request isallowed to pass to the web servers so that the requested transaction canbe performed. For example, an item may be added to a user's shoppingcart, money may be transferred between two accounts, or an account maybe logged into depending on the particular transaction at issue. In someimplementations, requested transactions may involve running one or moreback-end programs at the origin web servers. Accordingly, the CDN mayforward the request to the web servers (stage 426) if the request isdeemed valid. At stage 428, the origin web servers perform the requestedtransaction. The request may also be de-coded by the web servers or thesecurity intermediary by applying transformations that are the reverseof the transformations made at stage 412, so that the request can beproperly interpreted by the web server. On the other hand, the CDN maynot communicate the request to the web servers if the request is deemedinvalid (stage 424), thereby blocking performance of the requestedtransaction.

Turning to FIG. 6, a block diagram is shown of an example computingsystem 600 for implementing asymmetrical challenges in served content toimprove computer security. The system 600 can include a challengegenerator 606, a request validator 608, and a transformation module 616.In some implementations, the system 600 may include one or morecommunications interfaces for communicating with one or more servers 604a-n and a plurality of client computers 602 a-n over a network (e.g.,the Internet). The servers 604 a-n may most host content that the system600 can supplement with code for causing the client computers to solve achallenge. For example, the servers 604 a-n may host content for a website. The client computers 602 a-n may request content from the servers604 a-n, and the system 600 may re-code the requested content before toinject challenge code for execution on the client computers before thecontent is delivered to the clients 602 a-n. In some implementations,the system 600 may also be said to encompass the origin servers 604 a-n.For example, the system 600 may be implemented as one or more moduleswithin the origin servers 604 a-n, or the system 600 may be implementedin dedicated hardware across one or more computers separate from theorigin servers 604 a-n. Generally, various suitable configurations of anetwork in which the system 600 may operate is described in greaterdetail with respect to FIG. 3. Particular aspects of the system 600, forexample, may be implemented at the origin web servers, at one or moresecurity intermediaries, at servers at the edges of a content deliverynetwork (CDN), or in coordination among various these various computers.In some implementations, the system 600 may be configured to perform allor portions of the processes 400 and 500 as described with respect toFIGS. 4 and 5, above.

The challenge generator 606 is arranged to create challenges to serve tothe client computers 602 a-n, and to serve the challenges along withcontent that the client computers 602 a-n have requested from the originweb servers 604 a-n. Generally, the challenges may includeclient-executable code, such as JavaScript, that the client computers602 a-n can run in order to determine a solution to the challenge. Thesolution may be a required parameter to include in requests to theorigin servers 604 a-n to initiate certain web transactions. Requests toinitiate web transactions that lack a valid solution to a challenge maybe denied in some implementations. In some implementations, thechallenges may serve as a mechanism for slowing the rate at whichbotnets can submit requests to the web servers 604 a-n. The rate ofcomputationally expensive requests received by the web servers 604 a-nmay be degraded to such a degree that botnets are unable to successfullycarry out a distributed denial of service attack, for example.

In some implementations, the challenge generator 606 can randomlygenerate parameters for each challenge that is to be served. In thisway, each time a challenge is served, the different parameters maygenerally require each of the client computers 602 a-n to generate asolution that is unique to the particular challenge that was served tothe individual client computer 602 a-n in a given instance. In someimplementations, the challenge may be based on a hashing algorithm suchas the HMAC/SHA-2 algorithm provided in Equation 1, above. The challengegenerator 606 may randomly choose a key value r and a message value r′,and may then compute an HMAC value h using the key and message values r,r′. The challenge generator 606 may then supplement content from theorigin servers 604 a-n with challenge code that may run automatically onthe client computers 602 a-n when the content is loaded by the clientcomputer. The challenge code may cause the client computers 602 a-n toiteratively test different message values r′ in Equation 1 until asolution is determined. Because the hashing algorithm on which thechallenge is based may be substantially non-reversible, it may take timefor the client computers 602 a-n to solve their respective challengesusing the brute-force approach provided in the challenge code, but theremay be no ready way to shortcut the brute-force approach. In someimplementations, the challenge generator may also include a timestamp tand a signature s with each challenge served to the client computers 602a-n. These parameters may be later used to verify that solutions tolegitimate challenges are being submitted, rather than fraudulentchallenges that may have been independently generated by untrustedsources, for example. The signature s may be computed according toEquation 2, as described above.

In some implementations, when one of the client computers 602 a-n solvesa challenge, the solution may be included in a request to initiate a webtransaction. Before initiating the web transaction, the requestvalidator 608 may check various aspects of the request to determinewhether it is valid. The transactions specified in valid requests maythen be performed, while the transactions specified in invalid requestsmay be denied. The request validator 608 may include several componentsthat each verifies a different aspect of the request, namely a solutionvalidator 610, an anti-manipulation module 612, and an anti-replaymodule 614. If the components 610-614 verify all aspects of the request,then the request may be deemed valid. In some implementations, if anyone of the aspects of the request is not verified, then the request maybe deemed invalid.

First, the solution validator 610 is configured to verify that thesolution included in a request is an accurate solution to a particularchallenge provided to a client computer 602. For example, the solutionvalidator 610 may extract from the request a message value r′, which theclient computer 602 determined as the solution to the challenge, and theparameters r (key value) and h (HMAC value). The r and h values may bereturned in the request, and may have been previously provided to theclient computer 602 in the challenge code. The solution validator 610can then use the r and r′ values as input to Equation 1, and candetermine whether the resulting HMAC value matches the pre-determinedHMAC value h extracted from the request. If the values match, then thesolution may be classified as accurate.

Second, the anti-manipulation module 612 can verify that the clientcomputer 602 has submitted a solution to a valid challenge. The validityof a challenge may depend on whether the challenge was generated by atrustworthy source, and whether the challenge was solved in a timelymanner. To this end, the client computer 602 may include in the requestthe timestamp t and signature s. The anti-manipulation module 612 canverify that the signature s is valid by using a secret key k, thepre-determined HMAC value h, and the timestamp tin Equation 2 tore-compute a signature and to determine if it matches the signature sincluded in the request. A valid signature s indicates that thechallenge appears to have been generated by a trusted source, under theassumption that only trusted sources are in possession of the secret keyk. Moreover, the timestamp t can be compared to a current time at whichthe request is being validated. If too much time has elapsed since fromthe time when the challenge was generated as indicated in timestamp t,then the challenge may be stale. Moreover, the attackers may beprevented from tampering with the timestamp t without affectingvalidation of the signature s.

In some implementations, the request validator 608 can include a thirdcomponent as anti-replay module 614. The anti-replay module 614 canverify that solutions to particular challenges are not submitted morethan a threshold number of times, as might occur in a replay attack. Insome implementations, the threshold number of times may be one, suchthat a solution to a particular challenge will be only be accepted asvalid once. Subsequent attempts by client computers 602 to re-usesolutions or re-use challenges may be denied. For example, for hashingchallenges based on the HMAC/SHA-2 algorithm of Equation 1, the HMACvalue h can uniquely identify a challenge so long as multiple challengesare not served in different instances that yield the same HMAC value.The anti-replay module 614 may thus maintain a log of all the HMACvalues h that are submitted in requests from the client computers 602.Each time a new HMAC value h is encountered, it may be added to the log.Thereafter, subsequent requests that include an h value that has alreadybeen recorded in the log may be deemed invalid and denied. In someimplementations, the h value may be included in the path in a URI of arequest, and the computing system 600 may return a cached page for theparticular URI rather than checking the log for each request.

In some implementations, the system 600 can further include atransformation module 616. The transformation module 616 can generallybe arranged to re-code content served by the origin web servers 604 a-nbefore the content is delivered to the client computers 602. In someimplementations, the transformation module may re-code web pages andother types of electronic resources in a manner like the securityservers 702 a-n depicted in FIG. 7. In some implementations, thetransformation module may carry out re-coding operations in a mannerlike that described in stage 412 of the process 400 of FIG. 4. Forexample, the transformation module 616 may randomly re-code particularportions of a web page in order to obscure an implicit API and operatingcharacteristics of the web servers 604 a-n. The transformations appliedby the transformation module 616 may interfere with the ability ofattackers to carry out various types of computer attacks via a clientcomputer 602 that has been infected with a malicious bot, for example.In some implementations, the transformations may be made in a mannerthat does not substantially affect a presentation or functionality ofthe content from the user's perspective. The transformations may also bechanged over time so that resources are re-coded in differently acrossparticular servings of a resource.

FIG. 7 shows a system 700 for serving polymorphic and instrumented code.The system 700 may be adapted to perform deflection and detection ofmalicious activity with respect to a web server system. The system 700in this example is a system that is operated by or for a large number ofdifferent businesses that serve web pages and other content over theinternet, such as banks and retailers that have on-line presences (e.g.,on-line stores, or on-line account management tools). The main serversystems operated by those organizations or their agents are designatedas web servers 704 a-704 n, and could include a broad array of webservers, content servers, database servers, financial servers, loadbalancers, and other necessary components (either as physical or virtualservers).

A set of security server systems 702 a to 702 n are shown connectedbetween the web servers 704 a to 704 n and a network 710 such as theinternet. Although both extend to n in number, the actual number ofsub-systems could vary. For example, certain of the customers couldinstall two separate security server systems to serve all of their webserver systems (which could be one or more), such as for redundancypurposes. The particular security server systems 702 a-702 n may bematched to particular ones of the web server systems 704 a-704 n, orthey may be at separate sites, and all of the web servers for variousdifferent customers may be provided with services by a single common setof security servers 702 a-702 n (e.g., when all of the server systemsare at a single co-location facility so that bandwidth issues areminimized).

Each of the security server systems 702 a-702 n may be arranged andprogrammed to carry out operations like those discussed above and belowand other operations. For example, a policy engine 720 in each suchsecurity server system may evaluate HTTP requests from client computers(e.g., desktop, laptop, tablet, and smartphone computers) based onheader and network information, and can set and store sessioninformation related to a relevant policy. The policy engine may beprogrammed to classify requests and correlate them to particular actionsto be taken to code returned by the web server systems before such codeis served back to a client computer.

When such code returns, the policy information may be provided to ade-code, analysis, and re-encode module 724, which matches the contentto be delivered, across multiple content types (e.g., HTML, JavaScript,and CSS), to actions to be taken on the content (e.g., using XPATHwithin a DOM), such as substitutions, addition of content, and otheractions that may be provided as extensions to the system. For example,the different types of content may be analyzed to determine naming thatmay extend across such different pieces of content (e.g., the name of afunction or parameter), and such names may be changed in a way thatdiffers each time the content is served, e.g., by replacing a named itemwith randomly-generated characters. Elements within the different typesof content may also first be grouped as having a common effect on theoperation of the code (e.g., if one element makes a call to another),and then may be re-encoded together in a common manner so that theirinteroperation with each other will be consistent even after there-encoding.

Both the analysis of content for determining which transformations toapply to the content, and the transformation of the content itself, mayoccur at the same time (after receiving a request for the content) or atdifferent times. For example, the analysis may be triggered, not by arequest for the content, but by a separate determination that thecontent newly exists or has been changed. Such a determination may bevia a “push” from the web server system reporting that it hasimplemented new or updated content. The determination may also be a“pull” from the security servers 702 a-702 n, such as by the securityservers 702 a-702 n implementing a web crawler (not shown) like webcrawler 162 in FIG. 1 to recursively search for new and changed contentand to report such occurrences to the security servers 702 a-702 n, andperhaps return the content itself and perhaps perform some processing onthe content (e.g., indexing it or otherwise identifying common termsthroughout the content, creating DOMs for it, etc.). The analysis toidentify portions of the content that should be subjected to polymorphicmodifications each time the content is served may then be performedaccording to the manner discussed above and below.

A rules engine 722 may store analytical rules for performing suchanalysis and for re-encoding of the content. The rules engine 722 may bepopulated with rules developed through operator observation ofparticular content types, such as by operators of a system studyingtypical web pages that call JavaScript content and recognizing that aparticular method is frequently used in a particular manner. Suchobservation may result in the rules engine 722 being programmed toidentify the method and calls to the method so that they can all begrouped and re-encoded in a consistent and coordinated manner.

The de-code, analysis, and re-encode module 724 encodes content beingpassed to client computers from a web server according to relevantpolicies and rules. The module 724 also reverse encodes requests fromthe client computers to the relevant web server or servers. For example,a web page may be served with a particular parameter, and may refer toJavaScript that references that same parameter. The de-code, analysis,and re-encode module 724 may replace the name of that parameter, in eachof the different types of content, with a randomly generated name, andeach time the web page is served (or at least in varying sessions), thegenerated name may be different. When the name of the parameter ispassed back to the web server, it may be re-encoded back to its originalname so that this portion of the security process may occur seamlesslyfor the web server.

A key for the function that encodes and de-codes such strings can bemaintained by the security server system 702 along with an identifierfor the particular client computer so that the system 702 may know whichkey or function to apply, and may otherwise maintain a state for theclient computer and its session. A stateless approach may also beemployed, whereby the system 702 encrypts the state and stores it in acookie that is saved at the relevant client computer. The clientcomputer may then pass that cookie data back when it passes theinformation that needs to be de-coded back to its original status. Withthe cookie data, the system 702 may use a private key to decrypt thestate information and use that state information in real-time to de-codethe information from the client computer. Such a statelessimplementation may create benefits such as less management overhead forthe server system 702 (e.g., for tracking state, for storing state, andfor performing clean-up of stored state information as sessions time outor otherwise end) and as a result, higher overall throughput.

The de-code, analysis, and re-encode module 724 and the security serversystem 702 may be configured to modify web code differently each time itis served in a manner that is generally imperceptible to a user whointeracts with such web code. For example, multiple different clientcomputers may request a common web resource such as a web page or webapplication that a web server provides in response to the multiplerequests in substantially the same manner. Thus, a common web page maybe requested from a web server, and the web server may respond byserving the same or substantially identical HTML, CSS, JavaScript,images, and other web code or files to each of the clients insatisfaction of the requests. In some instances, particular portions ofrequested web resources may be common among multiple requests, whileother portions may be client or session specific. The de-code, analysis,and re-encode module 724 may be adapted to apply different modificationsto each instance of a common web resource, or common portion of a webresource, such that the web code that it is ultimately delivered to theclient computers in response to each request for the common web resourceincludes different modifications.

Such modification may occur according to a process that analyzes thecode once for each time it changes in a material way, and then appliesthe analysis multiple times. For example, elements that can be changedwithout affecting the presentation of a web page may be located by wayof analysis, as may additional instances of those elements through allthe code (e.g., HTML, CSS, and JavaScript). A mapping may be made of thetypes and locations of such elements. Then, each time the code is to beserved, the mapping may be used to place random characters or othersubstitute content in place of each occurrence of each such element.This repeated process may be performed, in certain implementations, withmuch less computational overhead than would a combined reanalysis andsubstitution for every serving.

The security server system 702 can apply the modifications in a mannerthat does not substantially affect a way that the user interacts withthe resource, regardless of the different transformations applied, evenwhere different modifications are applied in responding to multiplerequests for a common web resource. For example, when two differentclient computers request a common web page, the security server system702 applies different modifications to the web code corresponding to theweb page in response to each request for the web page, but themodifications do not substantially affect a presentation of the web pagebetween the two different client computers. The modifications cantherefore be made largely transparent to users interacting with a commonweb resource so that the modifications do not cause a substantialdifference in the way the resource is displayed or the way the userinteracts with the resource on different client devices or in differentsessions in which the resource is requested.

In some implementations, the decode, analysis, and re-encode module 724may be configured to generate challenges, insert challenges, andvalidate solutions to challenges that occur in requests from clientcomputers. For example, the module 724 may determine parameters for anHMAC/SHA-2 hashing challenge, and insert code into content to be servedthat causes a client to compute a solution to the challenge. The module724 may include, for example, the challenge generator 606 and requestvalidator 608 from computing system 600 (FIG. 6) in someimplementations.

An instrumentation module 726 is programmed to add instrumentation codeto the content that is served from a web server. The instrumentationcode is code that is programmed to monitor the operation of other codethat is served. For example, the instrumentation code may be programmedto identify when certain methods are called, when those methods havebeen identified as likely to be called by malicious software. When suchactions are observed to occur by the instrumentation code, theinstrumentation code may be programmed to send a communication to thesecurity server reporting on the type of action that occurred and othermetadata that is helpful in characterizing the activity. Suchinformation can be used to help determine whether the action wasmalicious or benign.

The instrumentation code may also analyze the DOM on a client computerin predetermined manners that are likely to identify the presence of andoperation of malicious software, and to report to the security servers702 or a related system. For example, the instrumentation code may beprogrammed to characterize a portion of the DOM when a user takes aparticular action, such as clicking on a particular on-page button, soas to identify a change in the DOM before and after the click (where theclick is expected to cause a particular change to the DOM if there isbenign code operating with respect to the click, as opposed to maliciouscode operating with respect to the click). Data that characterizes theDOM may also be hashed, either at the client computer or the serversystem 702, to produce a representation of the DOM (e.g., in thedifferences between part of the DOM before and after a defined actionoccurs) that is easy to compare against corresponding representations ofDOMs from other client computers. Other techniques may also be used bythe instrumentation code to generate a compact representation of the DOMor other structure expected to be affected by malicious code in anidentifiable manner.

As noted, the content from web servers 704 a-704 n, as encoded byde-code, analysis, and re-encode module 724, may be rendered on webbrowsers of various client computers. Uninfected client computers 712a-712 n represent computers that do not have malicious code programmedto interfere with a particular site a user visits or to otherwiseperform malicious activity. Infected client computers 714 a-714 nrepresent computers that do have malware or malicious code (218 a-718 n,respectively) programmed to interfere with a particular site a uservisits or to otherwise perform malicious activity. In certainimplementations, the client computers 712, 714 may also store theencrypted cookies discussed above and pass such cookies back through thenetwork 710. The client computers 712, 714 will, once they obtain theserved content, implement DOMs for managing the displayed web pages, andinstrumentation code may monitor the respective DOMs as discussed above.Reports of illogical activity (e.g., software on the client devicecalling a method that does not exist in the downloaded and renderedcontent) can then be reported back to the server system.

The reports from the instrumentation code may be analyzed and processedin various manners in order to determine how to respond to particularabnormal events, and to track down malicious code via analysis ofmultiple different similar interactions across different clientcomputers 712, 714. For small-scale analysis, each web site operator maybe provided with a single security console 707 that provides analyticaltools for a single site or group of sites. For example, the console 707may include software for showing groups of abnormal activities, orreports that indicate the type of code served by the web site thatgenerates the most abnormal activity. For example, a security officerfor a bank may determine that defensive actions are needed if most ofthe reported abnormal activity for its web site relates to contentelements corresponding to money transfer operations—an indication thatstale malicious code may be trying to access such elementssurreptitiously.

Console 707 may also be multiple different consoles used by differentemployees of an operator of the system 700, and may be used forpre-analysis of web content before it is served, as part of determininghow best to apply polymorphic transformations to the web code. Forexample, in combined manual and automatic analysis like that describedabove, an operator at console 707 may form or apply rules 722 that guidethe transformation that is to be performed on the content when it isultimately served. The rules may be written explicitly by the operatoror may be provided by automatic analysis and approved by the operator.Alternatively, or in addition, the operator may perform actions in agraphical user interface (e.g., by selecting particular elements fromthe code by highlighting them with a pointer, and then selecting anoperation from a menu of operations) and rules may be written consistentwith those actions.

A central security console 708 may connect to a large number of webcontent providers, and may be run, for example, by an organization thatprovides the software for operating the security server systems 702a-702 n—an organization separate from the organizations that serve thecontent. Such console 708 may access complex analytical and dataanalysis tools, such as tools that identify clustering of abnormalactivities across thousands of client computers and sessions, so that anoperator of the console 708 can focus on those clusters in order todiagnose them as malicious or benign, and then take steps to thwart anymalicious activity.

In certain other implementations, the console 708 may have access tosoftware for analyzing telemetry data received from a very large numberof client computers that execute instrumentation code provided by thesystem 700. Such data may result from forms being re-written across alarge number of web pages and web sites to include content that collectssystem information such as browser version, installed plug-ins, screenresolution, window size and position, operating system, networkinformation, and the like. In addition, user interaction with servedcontent may be characterized by such code, such as the speed with whicha user interacts with a page, the path of a pointer over the page, andthe like.

Such collected telemetry data, across many thousands of sessions andclient devices, may be used by the console 708 to identify what is“natural” interaction with a particular page that is likely the resultof legitimate human actions, and what is “unnatural” interaction that islikely the result of a bot interacting with the content. Statistical andmachine learning methods may be used to identify patterns in suchtelemetry data, and to resolve bot candidates to particular clientcomputers. Such client computers may then be handled in special mannersby the system 700, may be blocked from interaction, or may have theiroperators notified that their computer is potentially running malicioussoftware (e.g., by sending an e-mail to an account holder of a computerso that the malicious software cannot intercept it easily).

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a computer system 800. The system 800can be used to carry out the operations described in association withany of the computer-implemented methods described previously, accordingto one implementation. The system 800 is intended to include variousforms of digital computers, such as laptops, desktops, workstations,personal digital assistants, servers, blade servers, mainframes, andother appropriate computers. The system 800 can also include mobiledevices, such as personal digital assistants, cellular telephones,smartphones, and other similar computing devices. Additionally thesystem can include portable storage media, such as, Universal Serial Bus(USB) flash drives. For example, the USB flash drives may storeoperating systems and other applications. The USB flash drives caninclude input/output components, such as a wireless transmitter or USBconnector that may be inserted into a USB port of another computingdevice.

The system 800 includes a processor 810, a memory 820, a storage device830, and an input/output device 840. Each of the components 810, 820,830, and 840 are interconnected using a system bus 850. The processor810 is capable of processing instructions for execution within thesystem 800. The processor may be designed using any of a number ofarchitectures. For example, the processor 810 may be a CISC (ComplexInstruction Set Computers) processor, a RISC (Reduced Instruction SetComputer) processor, or a MISC (Minimal Instruction Set Computer)processor.

In one implementation, the processor 810 is a single-threaded processor.In another implementation, the processor 810 is a multi-threadedprocessor. The processor 810 is capable of processing instructionsstored in the memory 820 or on the storage device 830 to displaygraphical information for a user interface on the input/output device840.

The memory 820 stores information within the system 800. In oneimplementation, the memory 820 is a computer-readable medium. In oneimplementation, the memory 820 is a volatile memory unit. In anotherimplementation, the memory 820 is a non-volatile memory unit.

The storage device 830 is capable of providing mass storage for thesystem 400. In one implementation, the storage device 830 is acomputer-readable medium. In various different implementations, thestorage device 830 may be a floppy disk device, a hard disk device, anoptical disk device, or a tape device.

The input/output device 840 provides input/output operations for thesystem 400. In one implementation, the input/output device 840 includesa keyboard and/or pointing device. In another implementation, theinput/output device 840 includes a display unit for displaying graphicaluser interfaces.

The features described can be implemented in digital electroniccircuitry, or in computer hardware, firmware, software, or incombinations of them. The apparatus can be implemented in a computerprogram product tangibly embodied in an information carrier, e.g., in amachine-readable storage device for execution by a programmableprocessor; and method steps can be performed by a programmable processorexecuting a program of instructions to perform functions of thedescribed implementations by operating on input data and generatingoutput. The described features can be implemented advantageously in oneor more computer programs that are executable on a programmable systemincluding at least one programmable processor coupled to receive dataand instructions from, and to transmit data and instructions to, a datastorage system, at least one input device, and at least one outputdevice. A computer program is a set of instructions that can be used,directly or indirectly, in a computer to perform a certain activity orbring about a certain result. A computer program can be written in anyform of programming language, including compiled or interpretedlanguages, and it can be deployed in any form, including as astand-alone program or as a module, component, subroutine, or other unitsuitable for use in a computing environment.

Suitable processors for the execution of a program of instructionsinclude, by way of example, both general and special purposemicroprocessors, and the sole processor or one of multiple processors ofany kind of computer. Generally, a processor will receive instructionsand data from a read-only memory or a random access memory or both. Theessential elements of a computer are a processor for executinginstructions and one or more memories for storing instructions and data.Generally, a computer will also include, or be operatively coupled tocommunicate with, one or more mass storage devices for storing datafiles; such devices include magnetic disks, such as internal hard disksand removable disks; magneto-optical disks; and optical disks. Storagedevices suitable for tangibly embodying computer program instructionsand data include all forms of non-volatile memory, including by way ofexample semiconductor memory devices, such as EPROM, EEPROM, and flashmemory devices; magnetic disks such as internal hard disks and removabledisks; magneto-optical disks; and CD-ROM and DVD-ROM disks. Theprocessor and the memory can be supplemented by, or incorporated in,ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits).

To provide for interaction with a user, the features can be implementedon a computer having a display device such as a CRT (cathode ray tube)or LCD (liquid crystal display) monitor for displaying information tothe user and a keyboard and a pointing device such as a mouse or atrackball by which the user can provide input to the computer.Additionally, such activities can be implemented via touchscreenflat-panel displays and other appropriate mechanisms.

The features can be implemented in a computer system that includes aback-end component, such as a data server, or that includes a middlewarecomponent, such as an application server or an Internet server, or thatincludes a front-end component, such as a client computer having agraphical user interface or an Internet browser, or any combination ofthem. The components of the system can be connected by any form ormedium of digital data communication such as a communication network.Examples of communication networks include a local area network (“LAN”),a wide area network (“WAN”), peer-to-peer networks (having ad-hoc orstatic members), grid computing infrastructures, and the Internet.

The computer system can include clients and servers. A client and serverare generally remote from each other and typically interact through anetwork, such as the described one. The relationship of client andserver arises by virtue of computer programs running on the respectivecomputers and having a client-server relationship to each other.

While this specification contains many specific implementation details,these should not be construed as limitations on the scope of anyinventions or of what may be claimed, but rather as descriptions offeatures specific to particular implementations of particularinventions. Certain features that are described in this specification inthe context of separate implementations can also be implemented incombination in a single implementation. Conversely, various featuresthat are described in the context of a single implementation can also beimplemented in multiple implementations separately or in any suitablesubcombination. Moreover, although features may be described above asacting in certain combinations and even initially claimed as such, oneor more features from a claimed combination can in some cases be excisedfrom the combination, and the claimed combination may be directed to asubcombination or variation of a subcombination.

Similarly, while operations are depicted in the drawings in a particularorder, this should not be understood as requiring that such operationsbe performed in the particular order shown or in sequential order, orthat all illustrated operations be performed, to achieve desirableresults. In certain circumstances, multitasking and parallel processingmay be advantageous. Moreover, the separation of various systemcomponents in the implementations described above should not beunderstood as requiring such separation in all implementations, and itshould be understood that the described program components and systemscan generally be integrated together in a single software product orpackaged into multiple software products.

Thus, particular implementations of the subject matter have beendescribed. Other implementations are within the scope of the followingclaims. In some cases, the actions recited in the claims can beperformed in a different order and still achieve desirable results. Inaddition, the processes depicted in the accompanying figures do notnecessarily require the particular order shown, or sequential order, toachieve desirable results. In certain implementations, multitasking andparallel processing may be advantageous.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computer system comprising: a hardwareprocessor; a memory coupled to the hardware processor and storing one ormore instructions which, when executed by the one or more hardwareprocessors, cause the one or more hardware processors to: process a webpage request from a client for a web page comprising web code that, whenexecuted, allows submission of a request to initiate a web transactionwith a web server system; generate challenge code that, when executed,determines one or more challenge values that are a valid solution to achallenge; provide modified web code from a polymorphic recoding of aleast one function name of the web code with the challenge code to beserved in response to the web page request; receive a particular requestfrom the client to initiate the web transaction, the particular requestincluding a submitted solution comprising one or more solution values;determine when the one or more solution values are not the validsolution; and in response to the determination that the one or moresolution values are not the valid solution, prevent the web serversystem from processing the particular request.
 2. The computer system ofclaim 1, wherein the prevent the web server system from processing theparticular request further comprises not forwarding the particularrequest to the web server system.
 3. The computer system of claim 1,wherein the challenge code comprises at least one script that is writtenin JavaScript that is configured to be interpreted and executed at theclient.
 4. The computer system of claim 1, wherein, when the modifiedcode executes at the client, the client determines the submittedsolution to the challenge after the web page is loaded at the client. 5.The computer system of claim 1, wherein the determine when the one ormore solution values are not the valid solution to the challengecomprises verifying that the solution values were generated by theclient within a particular period of time after the modified code wasprovided to the client.
 6. The computer system of claim 1, wherein theone or more instructions, when executed by the one or more hardwareprocessors, cause the one or more hardware processors to: receive asecond web page request by a second client computing device for the webpage; generate second challenge code that, when executed, determines oneor more second challenge values that are a valid solution to a secondchallenge; provide second modified web code from another polymorphicrecoding of the web code with the second challenge code to be served inresponse to the second web page request; receive a second request fromthe client to initiate the web transaction, the second request includinga second submitted solution comprising one or more second solutionvalues; determine when the one or more second solution values are thevalid solution to the second challenge; and in response to determiningthat the one or more solution values are the valid solution to thesecond challenge, cause the web server system to process the secondrequest.
 7. The computer system of claim 1, wherein the polymorphicrecoding is further of an attribute value of the web code.
 8. A methodimplemented by a network security system comprising one or more contentnetwork delivery devices, security intermediary devices, origin webservers, or client devices, the method comprising: processing a web pagerequest from a client for a web page comprising web code that, whenexecuted, allows submission of a request to initiate a web transactionwith a web server system; generating challenge code that, when executed,determines one or more challenge values that are a valid solution to achallenge; providing modified web code from a polymorphic recoding of atleast one function name of the web code with the challenge code to beserved in response to the web page request; receiving a particularrequest from the client to initiate the web transaction, the particularrequest including a submitted solution comprising one or more solutionvalues; determining when the one or more solution values are not thevalid solution; and in response to determining that the one or moresolution values are not the valid solution, preventing the web serversystem from processing the particular request.
 9. The method of claim 8,wherein the preventing the web server system from processing theparticular request further comprises not forwarding the particularrequest to the web server system.
 10. The method of claim 8, wherein thechallenge code comprises at least one script that is written inJavaScript that is configured to be interpreted and executed at theclient.
 11. The method of claim 8, wherein, when the modified codeexecutes at the client, the client determines the submitted solution tothe challenge after the web page is loaded at the client.
 12. The methodof claim 8, wherein the determining when the one or more solution valuesare not the valid solution to the challenge comprises verifying that thesolution values were generated by the client within a particular periodof time after the modified web code was provided to the client.
 13. Themethod of claim 8, further comprising: receiving a second web pagerequest by a second client computing device for the web page; generatingsecond challenge code that, when executed, determines one or more secondchallenge values that are a valid solution to a second challenge;providing second modified code from another polymorphic recoding of theweb code with the second challenge code to be served in response to thesecond web page request; receiving a second request from the clientcomputing device to initiate the web transaction, the second requestincluding a second submitted solution comprising one or more secondsolution values; determining when the one or more second solution valuesare the valid solution to the second challenge; and in response todetermining that the one or more solution values are the valid solutionto the second challenge, causing the web server system to process thesecond request.
 14. The method of claim 8, wherein the polymorphicrecoding is further of an attribute value of the web code.
 15. Anon-transitory computer readable medium having stored thereoninstructions comprising executable code that, when executed by aprocessor, causes the processor to: process a web page request from aclient for a web page comprising web code that, when executed, allowssubmission of a request to initiate a web transaction with a web serversystem; generate challenge code that, when executed, determines one ormore challenge values that are a valid solution to a challenge; providemodified web code from a polymorphic recoding of at least one functionname value of the web code with the challenge code to be served inresponse to the web page request; receive a particular request from theclient to initiate the web transaction, the particular request includinga submitted solution comprising one or more solution values; determinewhen the one or more solution values are not the valid solution; and inresponse to the determination that the one or more solution values arenot the valid solution, prevent the web server system from processingthe particular request.
 16. The non-transitory computer readable mediumof claim 15, wherein for the prevent the web server system fromprocessing the particular request, the executable code, when executed bythe processors further causes the processors to: prevent forwarding ofthe particular request to the web server system.
 17. The non-transitorycomputer readable medium of claim 15, wherein the challenge codecomprises at least one script that is written in JavaScript that isconfigured to be interpreted and executed at the client.
 18. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein, when themodified code executes at the client, the client determines thesubmitted solution to the challenge after the web page is loaded at theclient.
 19. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15,wherein for the determine when the one or more solution values are notthe valid solution to the challenge, the executable code, when executedby the processors further causes the processors to: verify that thesolution values were generated by the client within a particular periodof time after the modified code was provided to the client.
 20. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 15, wherein theexecutable code, when executed by the processors further causes theprocessors to: receive a second web page request by a second clientcomputing device for the web page; generate second challenge code that,when executed, determines one or more second challenge values that are avalid solution to a second challenge; provide second modified web codefrom another polymorphic recoding of the web code with the secondchallenge code to be served in response to the second web page request;receive a second request from the client e to initiate the webtransaction, the second request including a second submitted solutioncomprising one or more second solution values; determine when the one ormore second solution values are the valid solution to the secondchallenge; and in response to determining that the one or more solutionvalues are the valid solution to the second challenge, cause the webserver system to process the second request.
 21. The non-transitorycomputer readable medium of claim 15, wherein the polymorphic recodingis further of an attribute value of the web code.
 22. A network securitysystem, comprising a network security system comprising one or morecontent network delivery devices, security intermediary devices, originweb servers, or client devices with memory comprising programmedinstructions stored thereon and one or more processors configured to becapable of executing the stored programmed instructions to: process aweb page request from a client for a web page comprising web code that,when executed, allows submission of a request to initiate a webtransaction with a web server system; generate challenge code that, whenexecuted, determines one or more challenge values that are a validsolution to a challenge; provide modified web code from a polymorphicrecoding of at least one function name value of the web code with thechallenge code to be served in response to the web page request; receivea particular request from the client to initiate the web transaction,the particular request including a submitted solution comprising one ormore solution values; determine when the one or more solution values arenot the valid solution; and in response to the determination that theone or more solution values are not the valid solution, prevent the webserver system from processing the particular request.
 23. The system ofclaim 22, wherein for the prevent the web server system from processingthe particular request, the processors are further configured to becapable of executing the stored programmed instructions to: preventforwarding of the particular request to the web server system.
 24. Thesystem of claim 22, wherein the challenge code comprises at least onescript that is written in JavaScript that is configured to beinterpreted and executed at the client.
 25. The system of claim 22,wherein, when the modified code executes at the client, the clientdetermines the submitted solution to the challenge after the web page isloaded at the client.
 26. The system of claim 22, wherein for thedetermine when the one or more solution values are not the validsolution to the challenge, wherein the processors are further configuredto be capable of executing the stored programmed instructions to: verifythat the solution values were generated by the client within aparticular period of time after the modified code was provided to theclient.
 27. The system of claim 22, wherein the processors are furtherconfigured to be capable of executing the stored programmed instructionsto: receive a second web page request by a second client computingdevice for the web page; generate second challenge code that, whenexecuted, determines one or more second challenge values that are avalid solution to a second challenge; provide second modified web codefrom another polymorphic recoding of the web code with the secondchallenge code to be served in response to the second web page request;receive a second request from the client e to initiate the webtransaction, the second request including a second submitted solutioncomprising one or more second solution values; determine when the one ormore second solution values are the valid solution to the secondchallenge; and in response to determining that the one or more solutionvalues are the valid solution to the second challenge, cause the webserver system to process the second request.
 28. The system of claim 22,wherein the polymorphic recoding is further of an attribute value of theweb code.